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U.S. officials have acknowledged that attackers of the lone-wolf and isolated-cell 
organizational types are on the rise and now pose a greater threat than major coordinated 
actions. Traditional intelligence methods, using a top-down approach with an emphasis 
on signals intelligence, are ill-equipped to identify and prevent terrorists using lone-wolf 
tactics. 
Crowdsourcing, as a problem-solving technique, is a relatively new idea but has 
shown great promise in tackling issues similar to the identification of lone-wolf terrorists. 
At its core, crowdsourcing is a method for thousands or even millions of people to 
contribute their knowledge, expertise, or skills toward a unified task. Done correctly, it 
has produced results unachievable by traditional tasking of humans or computers. 
This thesis identifies how the signals surrounding lone-wolf attacks are different 
and more subtle in nature from those mounted by organized terror groups. In turn, the 
thesis examines the potential benefits of crowdsourcing intelligence in order to strengthen 
the U.S. intelligence community’s ability to approach this emerging problem of lone-wolf 
terrorism. In short, this thesis proposes that the U.S. intelligence community harness the 
power of U.S. citizens to help prevent identify the subtle indictors presented by lone-wolf 
terrorists in order to prevent lone-wolf terrorist attacks. 
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I. PREVENTING LONE-WOLF TERRORISM:  
INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The large hierarchical terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda have been fractured and 
their power has greatly lessened thanks largely to efforts by American law enforcement 
and military organizations. But several U.S. officials have openly acknowledged that 
attackers of the lone-wolf or isolated-cell organizational type are on the rise and now 
pose a more serious threat than major coordinated actions. President Obama himself said 
that “a ‘lone-wolf’ terror attack in the United States is more likely than a major 
coordinated effort like the Sept. 11 attacks nearly a decade ago.”1  
Traditional intelligence methods, using a top-down approach with an emphasis on 
signals intelligence (SIGINT), are ill-equipped to identify and prevent terrorists using 
lone-wolf tactics. According to former Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano, 
“We are also seeing a rise of activities by individuals who are actually in the country, and 
they are acting by themselves and that kind of attack is the most difficult to prevent 
because there is nothing to intercept.”2 
Crowdsourcing, as a problem-solving technique, is a relatively new idea but one 
that has shown great promise in tackling issues similar to the identification of lone-wolf 
terrorists. At its core, crowdsourcing is a method for thousands or even millions of people 
to contribute their knowledge, expertise, or skills towards a unified task. Done correctly, 
it has produced results unachievable by traditional tasking of humans or computers. 
This thesis focuses on identifying how the signals surrounding lone-wolf attacks 
are different in nature from those mounted by organized terror groups. In turn, the thesis 
examines the potential benefits of crowdsourcing intelligence in order to strengthen the 
1 Associated Press, “Obama: ‘Lone Wolf’ Terror Attack More Likely Than Major Coordinated Effort,” 
The Huffington Post, August 16, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/16/obama-lone-wolf-
terror_n_928880.html. 
2 Trish Turner and The Associated Press, “Napolitano: ‘Lone Wolf’ Terrorists On the Rise, Most 
Difficult to Intercept,” Fox News, August 17, 2011, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/08/17/obama-
lone-wolf-terror-strike-biggest-concern/. 
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U.S. intelligence community’s ability to identify these signals and help address the 
problem of lone-wolf terrorism. In short, this thesis asks, can the U.S. intelligence 
community harness the power of U.S. citizens through crowd-sourcing to help prevent 
lone-wolf terrorist attacks? 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Lone-wolf terrorism has emerged as a popular and effective tactic for terrorists 
attacking the United States. Eliminating the complex organizational framework inherent 
to a traditional terrorist group’s structure makes it easier for lone-wolf terrorists to better 
avoid authorities’ efforts to detect and prevent their violent acts. People seeking political 
change through violent acts is not a new phenomenon. With today’s advances in science 
and vast amounts of information readily available to the masses through the Internet, 
individuals or smaller groups have the ability to cause massive amounts of destruction, a 
feat once reserved for much larger entities. Evidenced by such attacks as the Oklahoma 
City bombing, the DC sniper attacks, and the Boston Marathon bombing; this change in 
type and size of attack a lone actor is able to carry out has made lone-wolf terrorism a 
rising threat to society today. 
The lone wolf presents particular challenges to the traditional U.S. intelligence 
community. Because a lone-wolf operator engages in, at most, minimal communication 
with a terrorist group hierarchy, the traditional intelligence procedures of identifying key 
members of a group are less effective. Also, using electronic intercepts to expand the 
search methods using a top-down approach is much less likely to identify and prevent 
terrorists using lone-wolf tactics.3 Traditional SIGINT would identify the leader(s) of an 
organization and work to intercept communications. The lone wolf, however, rarely 
contacts a known terrorist group in a traceable manner, so he is more or less immune to 
SIGINT methods.  
In today’s Internet age, a lone wolf’s interactions usually take the form of reading 
Internet forums and participating in, or simply observing, chat rooms dedicated to radical 
principals. As Tim Lister points out in his report, “Analysis of the backgrounds of dozens 
3 Ibid. 
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of young men who have embraced militant Islam and eventually planned or carried out an 
act of violence shows that. . . many become radicalized online.”4 Unless these individuals 
are already under investigation for unrelated reasons, there is little chance traditional 
methods of intelligence would discover such interactions. Many experts have advocated 
for a more thorough and pervasive information search by officials. Education of police  
on terrorism indicators, enhanced reporting procedures, engagement with community 
leaders, as well as general community outreach on the subject of terrorism have all been 
suggested.5 But even these efforts are top-down in the sense that they are initiated, led 
by, and require large resource allocation by government officials.  
There has been little, if any, research on, or advocating for, an approach different 
from this top-down method. Top-down methodology uses the resource intensive tools of 
extracting intelligence through an active network of agents and officials who are 
constantly canvassing and soliciting the population for information that would identify 
and predict terrorist activities.  
Use of a grass-roots program such as crowdsourcing to gather intelligence on 
lone-wolf terrorists would reverse the information flow. This method has been proven 
effective in several relevant commercial applications such as the navigation application 
Waze, the human data processing endevour Mechanical Turk, and even the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA) Ten Red Balloons experiment. In each 
of these examples, the information is pushed upwards rather than relying on the system to 
pull the information. Using local experts has vastly reduced the time to solve problems 
and increased information available to the whole system. Likewise, these same 
techniques of harnessing local experts—citizens—can be applied to the problem of 
4 Tim Lister, “How do we stop ‘lone wolf’ attacks?,” CNN, October 27, 2014, 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/27/world/lone-wolves/.  
5 Michael P. Downing and Matt A. Mayer, “Preventing the Next ‘Lone Wolf’ Terrorist Attack 
Requires Stronger Federal–State–Local Capabilities,” Backgrounder, no. 2818, June 18, 2013, 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/06/preventing-the-next-lone-wolf-terrorist-attack-requires-
stronger-federalstatelocal-capabilities. 
  Beau Barnes, “Confronting the One-Man Wolf Pack: Adapting Law Enforcement and Prosecution 
Responses to the Threat of Lone Wolf Terrorism,” Boston University Law Review, vol. 92 (2012): 1631–
40. 
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identifying lone-wolf terrorists with the same expected gains in information and 
decreases in time. 
This new methodology has the potential to reduce the burden of information 
collection on the already overworked law enforcement cadre. It could also provide the 
U.S. citizenry with buy-in to the problem of terrorism prevention by making them active 
participants and thereby produce higher quality and larger amounts of intelligence than  
an unengaged community would. Additionally, using commercial innovations in 
crowdsourcing could streamline the information collection, processing, and distribution 
system to ensure the best data would be available in a timely manner to those 
organizations and personnel who could use it to prevent an attack. 
Lone-wolf terrorism, its structure, its identifiers, and methods for detecting it have 
been thoroughly covered in previous literature. Additionally, much has been written on 
the grassroots method of crowdsourced solutions to various problems faced by modern 
society. But little work has been done to link these two issues. This thesis argues that a 
unique synthesis of this lone-wolf threat with crowdsourced solutions has the potential to 
revolutionize how the United States approaches terrorism prevention in the future. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Innovations in the commercial sector that rely on crowdsourcing to solve large 
and difficult problems provide a different roadmap towards a method for identifying 
lone-wolf terrorists before they strike. Crowdsourcing has proven useful, efficient, and 
fast in dealing with problems ranging from navigation, scientific research, photograph 
identification, and rapid geo-location of unique items and persons. The human mind is a 
better pattern identifier, context creator, and data relationship analyzer than any computer 
today.6 It falls short in its speed and inability to process more than one item at a time. 
Crowdsourcing largely negates these shortfalls by establishing a parallel processing 
strategy for the participating human computers. 
6 Dominic Basulto, “Humans Are the World’s Best Pattern-Recognition Machines, But for How 
Long?,” Big Think, July 24, 2014, http://bigthink.com/endless-innovation/humans-are-the-worlds-best-
pattern-recognition-machines-but-for-how-long.  
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Using these crowdsourced techniques in the domestic intelligence field should 
provide the same benefits that have been reaped in the commercial sectors. The Waze 
navigation application and Google Maps are both able to collect, analyze, and display 
traffic data received from thousands of participants in real time so that drivers are 
provided the most current traffic conditions and hazards on the road at the moment. 
Wired Magazine journalist Evan Ratliff attempted to disappear from public view for 
thirty days by going off the grid and relocating to a different city. A team using 
crowdsourcing techniques was able find him in 25 days.7 Though the stakes are much 
higher, the identification of suspicious and potentially violent lone-wolf terrorists is no 
different procedurally from many of these tasks completed successfully by commercial 
crowdsourcing.  
The key elements of these tasks are the large and distributed sources of 
information coupled with a method of quickly and easily collecting and interpreting the 
data in a manner that is useful to the participants. Indeed, several local attempts to enact 
this sort of program have been initiated by multiple cities and municipalities, including 
the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority, the Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, and most 
notably the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness.8 Chapter II 
explains how they have all fallen short and produced insignificant information largely 
because they lacked the scale necessary for such an endeavor. With limited exposure and 
the resulting limited participation by citizens, these efforts provide little data for the 
systems to analyze. 
In crowdsourcing, the larger and more visible problems, which capture public 
interest, typically result in wider participation by the populace. This wide participation is 
critical to the viability of crowdsourcing as a solution to a problem. With large amounts 
7 Christopher M. Ford, “Twitter, Facebook, and Ten Red Balloons: Social Network Problem Solving 
and Homeland Security,” (master’s thesis Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 2. 
8 SAFE-NJ Itunes preview, Apple, accessed August 30, 2014, https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/safe-
nj/id791702468?mt=8. 
  MARTA See & Say Itunes preview, Apple, accessed August 30, 2014, 
https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/marta-see-say/id620437590?mt=8. 
  MBTA See Say Itunes preview, Apple, accessed August 30, 2014, 
https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/mbta-see-say/id523210770?mt=8.  
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of data and inputs from a wide variety of sources, data can be statistically analyzed and 
trends discerned. Additionally, spurious data is more easily filtered out with large 
amounts of data to compare. With a small number of data points, statistical analysis and 
big data manipulation are problematic because each piece of data stands alone and there 
is much less ability for the pieces of data to overlap and reinforce that which is true and 
flag those pieces that are false.  
In simple terms, crowdsourcing is much like determining the type of vehicle 
sitting in a parking lot based solely on the raindrops left on the ground from a storm. 
With only a few drops, the outline of the vehicle is indefinite and one may only be able to 
determine the very general class of it. As more raindrops strike the ground or are 
deflected by the vehicle, a more detailed and descriptive outline appears. Additionally, a 
few errant drops thrown under the vehicle from another passing vehicle could cause 
much more confusion to the analysis when there are only a few raindrops than when the 
outline was well established with many data points. As such, the most promising solution 
to identifying lone-wolf terrorists before they strike is a nationwide crowdsourced project 
that taps into the local expertise of the average citizen. 
This thesis argues that a national crowdsourcing intelligence program would need 
to be well publicized and promoted to ensure sufficient participation by the populace. 
Additionally, it would need to be in a format that most people are comfortable and 
familiar with. Ease of use and minimization of participants’ time and effort required for 
the program would be of high priority as well, based on current crowdsourcing doctrine. 
Gamification, “the use of game thinking and game mechanics in non-game contexts to 
engage users in solving problems,”9 using intrinsic and virtual rewards, also will be 
important in order to maintain user participation and recruit new users to the program. 
On the back end of the process, preliminary research indicates that a centralized 
database to collect all inputs, categorize them, and make them available for analysis will 
be critical for use by law enforcement officials. Connecting the dots is much more 
9 Sebastian Deterding, Dan Dixon, Rilla Khaled, and Lennart Nacke, “From Game Design Elements to 
Gamefulness: Defining ‘Gamification’,” in Proceedings of the 15th International Academic MindTrek 
Conference, 2011, 9–15, https://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/courses/compsci747s2c/lectures/paul/definition-
deterding.pdf. 
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effective when there are more dots to connect and a large central database is the best way 
to ensure the maximum amount of data is being cross-referenced and compared to one 
another. With wide dissemination to and adoption by the population, a centralized 
crowdsourced initiative has the capability of collecting large amounts of pertinent data on 
potential lone-wolf terrorism indicators identified by the local experts, the citizens. 
D. METHOD AND OVERVIEW 
This thesis uses a two-pronged approach, combining research on lone-wolf 
terrorist tactics and methodology with research into the use of crowdsourcing for 
solutions to problems deemed untenable using traditional methods. The thesis consists of 
five chapters, with Chapter I containing an introduction, the research question, an 
explanation of the study’s relevance, problems and hypothesis, research method, 
literature review, and road map. 
The lone-wolf terrorist problem is examined in Chapter II. It begins with several 
case studies of specific instances in which lone-wolf tactics were used by terrorists. They 
are profiled to identify indicators of potential lone-wolf actions. These case studies 
include the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing by Timothy McVeigh; the 2010 attempted car 
bombing of an Oregon Christmas tree lighting by Mohamed Osman Mohamud; and the 
2010 threatening of television producers and subsequent attempts to obtain foreign 
training to carry out attacks by Zachary Chesser. Case study analysis is the primary 
method used for the examination of lone-wolf tactics and to identify potential patterns of 
behavior that could detect terrorists using these tactics before they strike. The case study 
set includes both successfully executed lone-wolf attacks and ones which were foiled. 
Chapter II concludes with an examination of current methods of identifying and 
preventing lone-wolf terrorists that are being implemented by law enforcement agencies 
in the United States. It draws from both scholarly works on the subject as well as 
firsthand accounts published by law enforcement officials. It identifies deficiencies in the 
identification process inherent to both the current methods and proposed traditional 
solutions in publication. 
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Chapter III examines crowdsourcing as a general tool for solving problems and 
asks whether this solution would be applicable to the problem of detecting lone-wolf 
terrorists. It reviews current industry uses of crowdsourcing and identifies the 
methodology’s strengths and weaknesses as well as which general types of problems 
crowdsourcing tends to excel at solving. It examines several case studies, to include; the 
navigation application Waze, the human data processing endevour Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk), and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA) Ten Red 
Balloons experiment. Through the analysis of these commercial efforts at crowdsourcing, 
the thesis attempts to identify the aspects of each program that made it successful at 
completing its assigned task and the advantages a crowdsourcing technique provides as 
well as the disadvantages involved. It is hypothesized that crowdsourcing excels at 
solving problems that are structurally similar in nature to the problem of identifying and 
predicting lone-wolf terrorist actions. Chapter III compares the types of problems that 
crowdsourcing has excelled at with the indictors of lone-wolf terrorism identified in 
Chapter II in order to confirm that crowdsourcing intelligence is feasible.  
Chapter IV accounts for previous limited uses of crowdsourcing in the 
counterterrorist field and explains why these attempts have been largely unsuccessful. By 
examining these previous crowdsourcing methods, both successful commercial endeavors 
and the less successful counterterrorist applications, this chapter outlines a potential 
method of using crowdsourced intelligence successfully to identify and prevent lone-wolf 
terrorists. The thesis fuses the research conducted of lone-wolf attack case studies with 
the information obtained on crowdsourcing business problems. Doing so, it will attempt 
to merge a disparate problem set with solution options in order to discover a unique and 
effective answer to the important and growing problem of preventing lone-wolf terrorist 
attacks. An examination of the viability of using these crowdsourcing techniques in 
solving this identification problem will be conducted using a simple comparison of 
identified problems with possible solutions that crowdsourcing affords. The problems 
that have been solved using crowdsourcing techniques hold great promise for the 
prevention of lone-wolf terrorism because of the close similarities shared between them 
and the problem of identifying lone-wolf terrorists. Specifically, crowdsourcing has 
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proven itself at finding lone individuals or isolated items in record times and at 
collecting, processing, and condensing large amounts of data from disaggregate sources 
to provide a unified picture of the situation. Both of these are problem sets that are 
directly applicable to the search for and identification of terrorists using lone-wolf tactics. 
Chapter IV concludes with ancillary measures required to successfully implement a 
crowdsourced counterterrorism effort and some added non-counterterrorism benefits 
inherent to a crowdsourced approach to intelligence. 
Chapter V provides a conclusion to the thesis and summarizes the findings of the 
previous chapters. It presents a addresses the counterargument against creating another 
form of domestic intelligence in light of the multitude of programs currently in existence. 
It also makes recommendations on how a crowdsourced domestic intelligence program 
could best be structured within current government institutions, as well as providing 
recommendations for further study on the subject. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section begins by examining the academic works on the subject of organized 
Islamic terrorism in general and its evolution from hierarchical organization to one of 
lone-wolf tactics. It will then look at works on lone-wolf terrorism specifically in an 
effort to discern the indictors that precede attacks by lone-wolf terrorists. Once the 
literature on terrorism and lone-wolf terror tactics are examined, the review will shift  
its focus and look at academic works on the subject of crowdsourcing, searching  
for advantages, disadvantages, and potential similarities between the problems 
crowdsourcing has solved in the civilian sector and the problem of identifying lone-wolf 
terrorists. 
1. Al-Qaeda: From Hierarchy to Lone Wolf 
Al-Qaeda serves as an excellent case study for this thesis. It is a group whose 
evolution from hierarchical organization to franchise and finally to lone wolves has been 
extensively documented. While the present research question does not focus on 
combating traditional hierarchical groups, understanding their development, organization, 
and evolution are critical, as lone-wolf tactics often develop and evolve from hierarchical 
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organizations. Al-Qaeda itself is a constant, thus in comparing the group when it was a 
hierarchical organization to when lone-wolf tactics dominated, many of the variables, 
such as ideology and goals, are removed from the comparison of hierarchical terrorism to 
lone-wolf terrorism. This process brings into greater contrast the differences lone-wolf 
methodologies present from the more traditional hierarchical groups.  
Examination of Al-Qaeda as a primary case study for a terrorist organization’s 
formation, development, and eventual collapse can be examined using several excellent 
sources. For example, Peter Bergen’s The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of 
Al-Qaeda’s Leader contains firsthand accounts detailing the early life of Osama bin 
Laden, his motivations in resorting to terrorism, and his rise to prominence and the 
eventual leadership of Al-Qaeda.10 Fawaz Gerges’ The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda is 
another work that provides a historical perspective on Al-Qaeda’s development.11 Al-
Qaeda was formed as a strictly hierarchical organization, but as pressure was applied and 
assets severed by opposing forces, Al-Qaeda was forced to evolve over time. This 
evolution took the form of local franchise groups initially and then evolved even further 
to an individual focus with lone-wolf tactics as its centerpiece.12 Understanding why and 
how lone-wolf tactics developed sheds light on their methodology and provides insight 
into ways to identify and prevent attacks using these tactics. Gerges’ last few chapters 
profile Al-Qaeda’s fracturing under international pressure. The resulting shift in tactics 
and procedures to lone-wolf tactics is particularly illuminating and useful for this thesis.  
There is a scholarly consensus that hierarchical terrorist organizations rarely 
choose lone-wolf tactics freely and of their own volition.13 Often, terrorist organizations 
10 Peter Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of Al-Qaeda’s Leader (New York: 
Free Press, 2006). 
11 Fawaz Gerges, The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
12 Ibid., 110. 
13 Gerges, Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda, 125, 152–154. 
  Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know, 385, 388, 393. 
  Christopher J. Fettweis, “Freedom Fighters and Zealots: Al-Qaeda in Historical Perspective,” 




                                                 
try to portray the shift to a “leaderless resistance” as a positive and empowering act, but it 
is usually a tactic to which they resort out of desperation once the hierarchical structure 
has become untenable due to disrupted lines of communication and an inability to 
maintain higher leadership in positions of control.14 As such, lone-wolf terrorists are 
acting from a position of weakness and desperation rather than one of power. This 
position of weakness makes them no less deadly, but may provide insight into their 
motivations, thought processes, and methodologies—which will change based on this 
new position of weakness. These changes, such as reduced communications, more insular 
planning, and large increases in compartmentalization, result in indicators which are 
different and more subtle than those hierarchical terrorist organizations emit and which 
traditional intelligence collection methods have concentrated on in recent past. As such, a 
different method of detecting these new and subtle indicators is needed. 
2. Lone-Wolf Terrorism: A Unique Threat 
Literature on lone-wolf terrorism specifically has blossomed in the past decade as 
Al-Qaeda began to use lone-wolf tactics to a much greater extent. Scholars have 
completed comprehensive case studies of terrorist attacks using lone-wolf tactics and 
have examined not just what lone-wolf terrorists are, but also how they operate, as well 
as indicators and preparations for persons using these tactics. Raffaello Pantucci’s A 
Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist Terrorists serves as an 
academic touchstone in defining what a lone-wolf terrorist is and what sort of tactics are 
typically involved. Pantucci states in his opening paragraphs that, “The term Lone Wolf 
terrorist in this article is used to refer to individuals pursuing Islamist terrorist goals 
alone, either driven by personal reasons or their belief that they are part of an ideological 
group.”15 This thesis draws largely from his definition of who can be categorized as a 
14 Scott Stewart, “Cutting Through the Lone-Wolf Hype,” Security Weekly, September 22, 2011, 
https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110921-cutting-through-lone-wolf-hype. 
  Matthew Cole, “Al-Qaeda Promises U.S. Death By A Thousand Cuts,” ABC News, November 21, 
2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/al-qaeda-promises-us-death-thousand-cuts/story?id=12204726. 
15 Raffaello Pantucci, “A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist 
Terrorists,” Developments in Radicalisation and Political Violence, March 2011, 9, http://icsr.info/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/1302002992ICSRPaper_ATypologyofLoneWolves_Pantucci.pdf. 
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lone wolf when establishing the set of attacks, actors, and surrounding events that will be 
analyzed, broadening the lens beyond Islamist terrorist goals to terrorist goals writ large. 
One of the most useful aspects of Pantucci’s definition is the broad net that can be 
cast with it. In fact, the sentence that follows his definition of a lone-wolf terrorist states, 
“The term Lone Wolf is expanded out to Lone Wolf pack when referring to small isolated 
groups pursuing the goal of Islamist terrorism together under the same ideology, but 
without the sort of external direction from, or formal connection with, an organized group 
or network.”16 This thesis differs from his specific definition only in opening it up to 
other ideologies than radical Islamists. It is well established that radical Islamists neither 
invented nor hold a monopoly on the use of lone-wolf tactics. As such, Pantucci’s 
definition is too narrow in this respect. Using a modified form of his definition, events 
that are traditionally considered lone-wolf attacks—for example, Timothy McVeigh’s 
bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building—can be included even though several 
accomplices were discovered; thus, it was not, strictly speaking, an attack by an isolated 
actor. While events such as the Oklahoma City bombing and the Times Square bombing 
differ in ideology, the reasons for using lone-wolf tactics and the methodologies used by 
both attackers to prepare are similar. This indicates that methods of detecting one lone-
wolf terrorist may be applied to all lone-wolf terrorists, regardless of ideology.  
Ramón Spaaij’s “The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment” takes a 
much narrower view of lone-wolf terrorism and maintains that only those individuals 
operating completely alone and with no outside help can be considered lone wolves.17 
The 2012 Aurora, Colorado shooting is a prototypical example that complies with 
Spaaij’s definition of a lone-wolf terrorist since James Holmes planned and executed the 
entire event without any support from other parties. Despite this more restrictive 
definition of lone-wolf terrorism, the other portions of Spaaij’s work provide many useful 
insights into lone-wolf terrorists’ actions. Specifically, it examines the motivational 
patterns of lone-wolf terrorists, the social and psychological circumstances that motivate 
16 Ibid., 9. 
17 Ramón Spaaij, “The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment,” Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism vol. 33, no. 9 (2010): 856. 
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individuals to engage in lone-wolf terrorism, and the links between lone-wolf terrorists 
and other terrorist subjects, networks, and ideologies.18 These insights are useful not only 
in examining what type of person has conducted lone-wolf terrorist attacks already, but 
also what type of people are more likely to use this method in the future. If these 
indicators of lone-wolf terrorism preparation and planning can be codified, even if they 
are as subtle as they are expected to be, then that framework can be used to analyze 
intelligence data and thereby better prevent lone-wolf terrorist attacks. 
Beau Barnes’ “Confronting the One-Man Wolf Pack” picks up where the other 
titles leave off.19 He begins by briefly outlining the origins and definition of lone-wolf 
terrorism and then proceeds to identify methods currently in use by law enforcement to 
predict and prevent lone-wolf tactics. He describes the current process as a top-down 
approach that attempts to penetrate society itself in order to pull out pertinent information 
concerning terrorism. He continues with a discussion on why these measures fall short 
and have been so unsuccessful in preventing lone-wolf tactics in the recent past. 
Traditional electronic surveillance provides much larger amounts of data than can be 
processed at a central location, analyzing every Tweet, Facebook post, and e-mail sent is 
too large a task. This fire hose of data can only be managed effectively when it is 
narrowly focused on an already identified target of interest and does poorly at wide 
canvassing for initial indicators. 
This limitation has been recognized by law enforcement officials and has 
spawned alternative methods of wide-area canvassing for counterterrorism intelligence 
such as community outreach. Community outreach suffers its own limitations with an 
exponentially increasing workload on the collector as the intelligence coverage is 
increased. A single police officer can only interact with a finite number of local citizens 
in order to gather domestic intelligence and there are more people to contact than there 
are police officers available to do so. As such, several solutions are available: one can 
accept the resource limitations and only reach out to a portion of the citizenry, one can 
increase law enforcement budgets to support larger numbers of officer to conduct 
18 Ibid., 855. 
19 Barnes, “Confronting the One-Man Wolf Pack,” 1620-1621. 
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community outreach, or one can empower the citizens themselves to push the intelligence 
they have, as local experts, up to the appropriate officials. This third alternative has the 
potential of increasing intelligence collected without the proportional increases in law 
enforcement resources expended. It also may empower the citizenry by making them part 
of the solution and thereby generate better quality and larger volumes of intelligence. 
Ultimately, Barnes echoes many other sources in the belief that lone-wolf tactics pose a 
separate and unique problem to intelligence and law enforcement officials and further 
states that those agencies’ traditional methods of identification and prevention are ill-
suited to this problem.20 
Alex Shone’s work serves as an important primer for further consideration of 
those topics already discussed in this section as well as highlighting how law 
enforcement efforts should change in order to adapt to the unique threat of lone-wolf 
terrorism. Shone maintains in his article that: 
Counterterrorism services need to be far more attuned to those signals, as 
minimal as they might be, that any individual with a terrorist intent will 
inevitably give off in preparing his attack. This requires not only effective 
data capture and exploitation enabled by efficient overall information 
management, but also fused intelligence products. This requires 
intelligence analysts and collectors to work in far closer union.21 
This statement is echoed in several other academic works in the lone-wolf 
terrorism field and provides a useful segue into determining the best methods for law 
enforcement officials to use to identify and prevent lone-wolf terrorist before they attack. 
His further general insights into this topic make it apparent that using current 
technologies to crowdsource this problem could serve as a viable part of the solution. 
3. Crowdsourcing Intelligence: A Possible Alternative 
Unlike the topic of terrorism or even lone-wolf terrorism, crowdsourcing is a 
relatively new field with less academic discourse on the topic. The term itself only came 
20 Ibid., 1650–53. 
21 Alex Shone, “Countering lone wolf terrorism: sustaining the CONTEST vision,” The Henry Jackson 
Society, May 17, 2010, http://henryjacksonsociety.org/2010/05/17/countering-lone-wolf-terrorism-
sustaining-the-contest-vision/.  
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into existence in 2006 when it was coined by Jeff Howe in a Wired Magazine article on 
the subject.22 An examination of the literature that is available on the subject is crucial 
though, since initial analysis shows crowdsourcing as a promising technique for 
identifying lone-wolf terrorists before they strike. Jeff Howe, in Crowdsourcing: Why the 
Power of the Crowd is Driving the Future of Business23, provides many useful insights 
into crowdsourcing, the basis for its approach, ways to maximize its effectiveness, and 
why it has come of age so recently. A key point found throughout his book is that the 
most successful crowdsourcing initiatives have had top-down guidance but bottom-up 
participation with an emphasis on community building. According to Howe, “What 
unites all successful crowdsourcing efforts is a deep commitment to the community.”24 
This may be the most difficult paradigm shift that the intelligence community will need 
to tackle in order to make crowdsourcing a viable method of domestic intelligence 
collection since it runs counter to many of the well-ingrained practices and procedures of 
the field. If successful, crowdsourcing has the potential to provide the intelligence 
community with many benefits, both direct and indirect. Direct benefits such as increased 
insight into communities and more intelligence sources for potential threats are obvious. 
Indirect benefits such as citizen buy-in to the problem of counterterrorism and better 
public relations due to increased transparency and participation might be less obvious and 
will warrant further investigation. 
Daren Brabham, in a preeminent work, succinctly defines crowdsourcing as, “an 
online, distributed problem-solving and production model that leverages the collective 
intelligence of online communities to serve specific organizational goals.”25 This 
definition is not only representative of what crowdsourcing means to most scholars in the 
field but it provides a broad enough framework to enable the inclusion of government as 
well as private uses. Most importantly for this thesis, Brabham further outlines general 
22 Jeff Howe, “The Rise of Crowdsourcing,” Wired Magazine, June 2006, 
http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/14.06/crowds.html. 
23 Jeff Howe, Crowdsourcing: Why the Power of the Crowd is Driving the Future of Business (New 
York: Three Rivers Press, 2008). 
24 Howe, Crowdsourcing, 15. 
25 Daren Brabham, Crowdsourcing (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013). 
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types of problems or tasks at which crowdsourcing excels and those tasks at which 
crowdsourcing is less useful than other currently available methods of problem-solving. 
Crowdsourcing has two sides: the front end of gathering data from distributed human 
sources and the back end of compiling and analyzing this data in a manner that makes the 
results useful for the end-user. Thus, crowdsourcing can be equated to the intelligence 
process of collection and analysis, and in much the same way; one cannot be effective 
without the other. As such, research into the back end data analysis of crowdsourcing is 
as important as the front end in evaluating its uses in countering the lone-wolf threat. 
James Manyika and Michael Chui’s Big Data: The Next Frontier for  
Innovation, Competition, and Productivity is an examination of big data in the private 
sector and the effects that its use by businesses and industry have on their operation.26 It 
outlines methods useful for maximizing big data’s utility, such as increased transparancy 
and support of human decision making with automated algorithms.27 It also highlights 
such pitfalls as not having people with requisite statistical and analytical skills staffed in 
an organization to deal with big data.28 This thesis uses this work in order to outline the 
requirements for the operator’s side of any crowdsourced solution to lone-wolf 
identification. 
Crowdsourcing has proven itself at finding individuals or isolated items in record 
times and at collecting, processing, and condensing large amounts of data from 
disaggregate sources to provide a unified picture of the situation. Both of these are 
problem sets that are directly applicable to the search for and identification of terrorists 
using lone-wolf tactics. Twitter, Facebook, and Ten Red Balloons Social Network 
Problem Solving and Homeland Security by Christopher Ford and Inflated Expectations: 
Crowd-Sourcing Comes of Age in the DARPA Network Challenge by Larry Greenemeier 
both examine the most famous crowdsourcing case to date, namely, DARPA’s Ten Red 
Balloons experiment. In this experiment, DARPA sponsored a contest to locate ten 
26 James Manyika and Michael Chui, Big Data: The Next Frontier for Innovation, Competition, and 
Productivity (Washington, DC: McKinsey Global Institute, 2011). 
27 Ibid., 97–99. 
28 Ibid., 103–104. 
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tethered red balloons scattered throughout the continental United States at unknown 
locations. The goal was for an individual or team to locate all ten balloons and report 
their locations. DARPA estimated one week as the time required to complete the task. 
Using a dispersed network and crowdsourcing techniques, the winning team located all 
ten balloons in less than nine hours. Of specific importance to this thesis, both Ford and 
Greenemeier discuss the team’s methods of validating and confirming reported sightings 
despite a deluge of false reports generated by other teams. This is a prime example of the 
use of crowdsourcing and big data manipulation to solve a real-world problem and 
provides excellent precedent for application of the same techniques in counterterrorism.  
Chris Nodder’s Evil by Design: Interaction Design to Lead Us into Temptation is 
an excellent source for several other examples of crowdsourcing solutions to commercial 
problems, which include the navigation application Waze, the cellular biology research 
project Foldit, and the coupon selling program Groupon.29 Examination of these cases as 
well as the reasons behind each of their success will provide guidance on what a 
crowdsourced solution to identifying lone-wolf terrorists should incorporate in general 
terms. There are several other works on the subject of crowdsourcing which provide 
further examples of its use. These examples include not only commercial endevours but 
also government attempts to harness the power of the masses to solve problems such as 
combatting organized crime, responding to crisis events, and protecting public safety. In 
each one, the method of employment is detailed as well as any success or setbacks 
encountered in the process. Of more specific utility are the discussions on how to limit 
the influence of spurious data,whether it be intentional or unintentional in nature. This is 
a major problem forseen with crowdsourcing domestic intelligence and insights into 
methods of preventing spurious data are especially useful to this thesis. 
Though sparse, a few attempts at crowdsourcing problems related to homeland 
security and terrorism prevention specifically have been made. One attempt, funded by 
the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA), uses a market-based 
approach to the crowdsourcing of the intelligence community’s knowledge by asking 
29 Chris Nodder, Evil by Design: Interaction Design to Lead Us into Temptation (Indianapolis, IN: 
John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2013), 211–215. 
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experts to make predictions about potential global events such as the progress of the Free 
Syrian Army or if Kim Jong Un will resign as leader of North Korea.30 This project has 
been put on hold several times due to backlash and resentment from the traditional 
intelligence community but has been proven to be quite accurate in predicting certain 
outcomes of such large-scale events. For example, “Intrade’s consensus called every state 
correctly in the 2004 U.S. presidential election and all but two right in 2008.”31 Some of 
the backlash may be understandable and related to poor timing since the original IARPA 
effort involved placing odds on the next large terrorist attack and it was launched months 
before the 9/11 tragedy. Other, more general, critiques—such as former senior CIA and 
State Department analyst Mark Lowenthal’s statement that, “I don’t believe in the 
wisdom of crowds. Crowds produce riots. Experts produce wisdom.”32—may be relics of 
outdated thinking based on old paradigms. The same argument Lowenthal expresses has 
been made in the private sector but has been disproven both scientifically and through 
real-world experience multiple times.33 While not exactly in line with identifying lone-
wolf operators, the problems of public perception and professional acceptance faced by 
this project and the methods for overcoming those problems are relevant in solving 
similar problems encountered in crowdsourcing the identification of lone-wolf terrorists.  
Likewise, an article in Intelligence and National Security titled, “Introducing 
Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT),” provides parallel examples of large data 
collection and using crowds to gather intelligence in order to combat crime and 
terrorism.34 Though more focused on pulling data from social media rather than have it 
voluntarily pushed up by the citizens, this article also touches on user participation in the 
collection, lending a crowdsourced aspect to the process. The most salient points in this 
30 Ken Dilanian, “America’s Top Spies Go Up Against a Crowd,” Los Angeles Times, August 21, 
2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/aug/21/nation/la-na-cia-crowds-20120821.  
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Brabham, Crowdsourcing, 20–21. 
    Howe, Crowdsourcing, 11. 
34 David Omand , Jamie Bartlett, and Carl Miller, “Introducing Social Media Intelligence 
(SOCMINT),” Intelligence and National Security, 27:6, 801–823, 
http://www.academia.edu/1990345/Introducing_Social_Media_Intelligence_SOCMINT_.  
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SOCMINT article are the discussions on backend compilation and discrimination of data 
for such an endeavor, as well as the discussion on the public relations campaign which 
must be successfully executed to ensure the viability of such a program as SOCMINT or 
crowdsourced intelligence. This need for public buy-in to the process is rarely discussed 
in the intelligence literature as a whole and therefore makes this article even more 
valuable. 
Crowdsourcing of domestic intelligence provides another important advantage 
over traditional top-down intelligence collection methods. By making the program 
voluntary with cooperative participation by the citizenry, 4th Amendment issues of 
privacy and civil liberties are largely nullified. This is because, at its essence, 
crowdsourcing is no different than police crime hotlines which have been used for 
decades with no issue. The 1983 Supreme Court case Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 sets 
precedent for such anonymous tips and how they may be used by law enforcement to 
begin their own investigations.35 Crowdsourcing using mobile applications or other 
technological methods only has the potential to differ in volume of information passed 
and ability of law enforcement to utilize said data in a more efficient manner. 
Ample research and academic literature is available for both of the two main 
points of this thesis, framing the problem of identifying lone-wolf terrorists and 
crowdsourcing solutions to large problems. Managing big data will also play a part in 
forming the solution and literature on that subject is as prolific, if not more so, than either 
of the other topics. There exists a gap in both academic and professional literature 
concerning the application of crowdsourcing methodology to the problem of identifying 
lone-wolf terrorists before they strike. While some literature has analyzed crowdsourcing 
for general homeland security needs, none found so far directly addresses the 
identification of lone-wolf terrorists. This thesis will fill the gap by applying the tested 
and proven crowdsourced solutions, which have been pioneered by the civilian sector, to 
the problem of identifying lone-wolf terrorists before they strike. 
  
35 U.S. Supreme Court, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 1983 (Washington, DC, 1983), 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/462/213/case.html.  
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II. THE LONE-WOLF PROBLEM AND CURRENT  
METHODS TO COMBAT IT 
This chapter examines the lone-wolf terrorist problem. It begins with a historical 
account of the evolution of Al-Qaeda from one of the world’s most powerful and most 
hierarchical terrorist organizations to its current reduced standing and associated 
promotion of lone-wolf tactics. By comparing hierarchical Al-Qaeda with dispersed Al-
Qaeda, it establishes the reasons individuals gravitate to lone-wolf tactics as well as the 
advantages and disadvantages inherent to those tactics. Based on those advantages and 
disadvantages, the difficulties faced by law enforcement and intelligence services in 
detecting lone-wolf operators are laid out. Next, several case studies in which lone-wolf 
tactics were used by terrorists are shown in an effort to identify early indicators of 
potential lone-wolf actions. Chapter II concludes with an examination of current methods 
of identifying and preventing lone-wolf terrorists that are being implemented by law 
enforcement agencies in the United States. It identifies deficiencies in the identification 
process inherent to both the current methods and proposed traditional solutions in 
publication. The purpose of Chapter II is to highlight the gaps in the traditional domestic 
intelligence system and explain how lone-wolf terrorists are specially poised to fall into 
those gaps and evade detection. 
A. AL-QAEDA: FROM HIERARCHY TO INDIVIDUAL 
Al-Qaeda, formed by Osama bin Laden during the splintering of al-Tanzim al-
Sirri in 1966, was the antithesis of its parent organization.36 Whereas al-Tanzim al-Sirri 
was a grassroots effort with very local concerns and objectives that looked inward to the 
Muslim world, Al-Qaeda was an extremely hierarchical entity with tight controls 
administered by Bin Laden, and one that espoused large goals such as attacks on enemies 
of Islam and their jihad, or holy struggle, in foreign lands such as Israel and other 
previously Muslim countries. Al-Qaeda spent several decades in the development stage 
36 Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know, 80–81. 
  Gerges, Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda, 30. 
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but by the late 1980s, it was an organized and effective terrorist group with significant 
striking power and considerable reach. By the mid-1990s, Al-Qaeda had established its 
base of power in Afghanistan under a Taliban sanctuary and Osama Bin Laden began 
issuing fatwas, religious edicts, which called for a global jihad and declared war on the 
United States and its allies.37 
Seen as the height of Al-Qaeda’s hierarchical reign, these bold steps garnered 
international attention and enabled Al-Qaeda to recruit combat veterans from Bosnia, 
Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, and elsewhere. These veterans brought expertise and planning with 
them that enabled such attacks as the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the attack 
on the USS Cole (DDG 67). Al-Qaeda’s support base and operational range continued to 
grow through the following years and culminated in one of the boldest asymmetric 
attacks in history, the September 11th attack on the United States. Both a boon and a 
curse to Al-Qaeda, the attack would thereafter define Al-Qaeda as a whole and Bin Laden 
in particular. It served as a recruitment beacon to their cause for new fighters but also 
drew the ire of the entire civilized world, including most of the Muslim world. The event 
was polarizing and while it mobilized the most extreme and militant of jihadists, it also 
turned Al-Qaeda into a pariah which few other groups, Muslim or otherwise, wanted to 
touch.38 
After the fall of the Taliban to the U.S. military, Al-Qaeda was splintered and Bin 
Laden was forced to seek sanctuary in Pakistan. From there, he was able to establish a 
resistance to the U.S. occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan but saw the size of his forces 
reduced dramatically as country after country complied with U.S. efforts in eliminating or 
capturing Al-Qaeda operatives. This pressure on the central hierarchy led to the 
development of franchises of Al-Qaeda in specific geographic areas such as Al-Qaeda in 
Iraq (AQI) and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). This franchising brought 
some much needed flexibility and redundancy to the very hierarchical command structure 
37 Osama Bin Laden, “Text of Fatwah Urging Jihad Against Americans,” Al-Quds al-’Arabi, February 
23, 1998, http://web.archive.org/web/20060422210853/http://www.ict.org.il/articles/fatwah.htm. 
38 Gerges, Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda, 95, 103. 
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of Al-Qaeda but had the negative effect of divesting Bin Laden of much of the detailed 
control he was used to.39 
As sentiment turned against Al-Qaeda, it was forced to adopt a new structure 
which would be even less hierarchical than the franchise system. Al-Qaeda began issuing 
statements which rallied individual jihadists to action at the lowest level and with 
minimal contact with its command structure. Embracing a “strategy of a thousand cuts,” 
Al-Qaeda hoped it could bleed the West dry by forcing it to spend billions of dollars to 
prevent attacks which only cost thousands of dollars to carry out.40 
B. EMERGENCE OF THE LONE WOLF 
Today, Al-Qaeda is more an ideological basis for radicals than a military 
organization. Splinter groups still exist throughout the Middle East but are poorly 
manned and are rarely welcomed by host countries fearful of U.S. involvement and 
reprisals. Instead, its teachings and philosophy stand as a beacon for disenfranchised 
individual Muslims who want to take on the jihadist mantle and strike a blow against the 
godless West. As Gerges states, “Al-Qaeda’s ideology sanctions the killing of the 
enemies of Islam, including civilians, and therefore adapts easily to different 
temperaments, backgrounds, and concepts of victimhood. Al-Qaeda’s top-down 
recruitment of would-be terrorists has been, for the most part, replaced by a bottom-up 
process, a product of rising tensions and hostilities.”41 In his conclusion, Gerges provides 
insight into why these self-motivated bottom-up recruits are taking up the jihad by 
explaining that: 
Bottom-up radicalization has less to do with al-Qaeda Central and more 
with the side effects of the raging War on Terror in the greater Middle 
East. I interviewed several homegrown suspects who were found guilty in 
U.S. courts and almost all of them specifically mentioned the conflicts in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan as the main cause for their radicalization; 
of course they railed against the U.S. War on Terror, which they viewed as 
39 Ibid., 95, 110. 
40 Cole, “Al Qaeda Promises U.S. Death.” 
41 Gerges, Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda, 152. 
 23 
                                                 
a crusade against Islam and Muslims, but identity politics was the real 
driver behind their migration to militancy.42 
He further expounds that these self-radicalized jihadists were not necessarily 
fighting for the Al-Qaeda cause but were fighting against the injustices they viewed the 
United States and the West perpetrating against the Muslim community as a whole. Al-
Qaeda simply served as a convenient touchstone for them and an easy way to legitimize 
their own individual grievances and their violent means of addressing those grievances.43 
In many ways, this evolution of Al-Qaeda from hierarchy to lone wolf can be seen 
as a rudimentary form of crowdsourcing itself. By endorsing lone-wolf tactics and 
encouraging its use by Al-Qaeda’s base of support, it is fulfilling two of the three major 
requirements of a crowdsourcing endeavor: top-down guidance for overarching goals 
with bottom-up participation and development of the procedure. The one missing aspect, 
community building, is necessarily excluded since two-way communications and the 
establishment of dialogues would open the process up to traditional intelligence 
collection by Al-Qaeda’s enemies. Instead, by keeping the communication a broadcast 
rather than dialogue, this fractured and reduced organization of Al-Qaeda is able to 
continue to exert its influence and lay claim to many more, albeit smaller, acts of terror 
than it could have using traditional hierarchal methods. It is this desire to continue to 
exert a global influence even with a greatly reduced cadre of leaders and soldiers that has 
driven Al-Qaeda to outsource its terrorist operations to the masses. To a certain extent, 
U.S. actions against Al-Qaeda over the past decade and the resulting collateral damage 
and unintended consequences have facilitated this outsourcing by developing a base of 
disenfranchised and angry young Muslims who oppose U.S. behavior and are open to Al-
Qaeda’s message of individual jihad. Al-Qaeda can then tap this pool to act as 
independent agents of terror. 
As has been alluded to previously, there are some definite advantages for an 
organization that adopts or endorses lone-wolf tactics. Stated simply, low cost and 
difficulty in preventing the attacks are the two primary advantages that lone-wolf tactics 
42 Ibid., 160. 
43 Ibid., 161–164. 
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have over other forms of terrorism. From a terrorist group’s point of view, stoking the 
flames of hatred within individuals that have an inherent grudge against similar enemies 
and endorsing violence against those targets is much less expensive than carrying out the 
attack itself. Lone-wolf tactics negate the monetary and time investments terrorist groups 
have traditionally allocated to training operatives, planning an attack, and outfitting the 
operatives with the resources they needed to carry out the attack. 
Recent technology such as the Internet and e-mail has made the costs associated 
with indoctrinating lone-wolf operatives considerably cheaper. Books, writings, and 
manifestos were the norm for recruiting independent terrorists prior to the Internet 
revolution. These low-tech methods severely limited the number of potential lone wolves 
that could be reached.44 With the Internet, groups can put their message out for 
worldwide consumption for just pennies a day in server hosting costs and can interact on 
a personal basis with anyone in the world with a computer and e-mail account. Cheap 
communication works to the advantage of the individual’s being radicalized as well. With 
free access to any information on the Internet the cost of entry for a potential lone wolf is 
lowered. Previously, an individual would need to invest time and money in either buying 
a book or attending a speech. Now, all the same information can be attained from the 
convenience of their home using the Internet, a resource that most people are already 
purchasing for other reasons. 
There is an added advantage of having such interactions be very discrete, which is 
closely linked with the same aspects of lone-wolf recruitment that make it cheap. Even in 
the past, an individual buying a book or attending a speech was unlikely to be noticed by 
officials in the United States or most other western countries. Now, with the anonymity 
of the Internet, disenfranchised and mentally disturbed individuals are free to scour any 
and all sites and articles which reinforce their burgeoning beliefs. They are able to 
anonymously interact with others who share their same point of view through anonymous 
chat rooms in which pseudonyms are the norm. This limited and anonymous interaction 
with terrorist groups, even ones on official watch lists, means that a potential lone wolf 
44 Rodger A. Bates, “Dancing with Wolves: Today’s Lone Wolf Terrorists,” The Journal of Public 
and Professional Sociology, vol. 4, no. 1 (2012): 4. 
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can attain guidance and technical assistance with a small likelihood of detection. The 
head of counterterrorism for the New York Police Department John Miller has stated, “If 
the conspiracy to commit a terrorist act is a conspiracy of one, and the planning for that is 
unsophisticated, doesn’t require a lot pre-operational surveillance and is only happening 
in the mind of the offender, from an intelligence standpoint, from a prevention 
standpoint, that’s very hard to detect.”45 This is a sentiment echoed countless times by 
both professional law enforcement and academics studying the issue. Anonymity works 
in the other direction as well. Using the anonymity of Internet communication allows Al-
Qaeda to continue the fight against the West while the leadership remains in the relative 
safety of exile. 
The final major advantage lone wolves typically have is their inherent knowledge 
of local customs, practices, and operating environment of their targets and surrounding 
areas. Though academic literature agrees that profiling a typical lone-wolf terrorist is 
impossible since they have a myriad of motivations which often mixes a terrorist group’s 
rhetoric with their own personal grievances, one of the few trends readily documented is 
the tendency for lone-wolf terrorists to strike locally.46 This local knowledge not only 
gives them the ability to better choose targets for their vulnerability and importance but 
also allows them to blend in and conceal their preparations from law enforcement 
officials. 
One major disadvantage of lone-wolf tactics is the inherent lack of control 
terrorist groups can exert over operations. While they can recommend and present ideas 
and motivations, a group who has turned over activities to the crowd no longer has the 
degree of control a group using traditional command and control can exert. Al-Qaeda 
experienced this sort of hardship when their franchise in Iraq, under the leadership of 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, began targeting Sunni Muslims and as a result, alienated a large 
45 Tom Hays, “Lone-Wolf Terror Threat Focus of NYPD Conference,” ABC News, November 6, 2014, 
http://abcnews.go.com/U.S./wireStory/lone-wolf-terror-threat-focus-nypd-conference-26746906.  
46 Michael Becker, “Explaining Lone Wolf Target Selection in the United States,” Studies in Conflict 
& Terrorism, vol. 37,no. 11 (2014): 967–969. 
Sarah Teich, “Trends and Developments in Lone Wolf Terrorism in the Western World: An Analysis 
of Terrorist Attacks and Attempted Attacks by Islamic Extremists,” International Institute for Counter-
Terrorism, http://www.ctcitraining.org/docs/LoneWolf_SarahTeich2013.pdf, 22. 
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portion of their support base. Al-Zarqawi was able to deviate from Bin Laden’s orders to 
such a great degree because he had been given wide latitude in organizing and running 
AQI. This sort of issue is greatly exacerbated by the much looser ties that lone wolves 
have with their parent organizations. 
Another disadvantage of lone-wolf tactics for terrorist organizations is the 
diffusion of their message, which can occur when such tactics are used. This can be 
equated to the problem of making a copy of a copy: an original image copied enough 
times becomes distorted to the point of being unrecognizable. Likewise, if a lone wolf is 
motivated by Al-Qaeda’s original message but modifies it to fit his own world view and 
then successfully carries out an attack which might not strictly be in line with Al-Qaeda’s 
message and purpose, this poses a copy issue. Long term, another disenfranchised 
individual may see that first lone wolf as inspiration for his own acts which deviate even 
further from Al-Qaeda’s goals. This has been seen firsthand by Gerges, “Young activists 
in France, Spain, Britain, and Italy [are] out of touch with recent developments in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.”47 This inability to firmly control and guide the group’s 
message represents a long-term strategic disadvantage. In fact, the loss of control over 
terrorist acts as described previously is also a strategic loss. Both these long-term 
strategic losses are accepted by Al-Qaeda in exchange for the short-term tactical 
advantages that lone-wolf tactics bring; specifically, greater economy of force and 
increased secrecy of operations. 
While lone-wolf tactics have their tradeoffs, their unique advantages are causing 
traditional intelligence collection methods to be rendered mostly impotent in the 
identification and prevention of terrorist attacks.48 The U.S. intelligence community 
excels at its technical means of collection. Tapping phones, listening to satellite 
communications, and penetrating enemy computer systems are the hallmarks of U.S. 
intelligence efforts. For the most part, this emphasis on the technical has served the 
United States well, since it has coincided with the emergence and global domination of 
47 Gerges, Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda, 165. 
48 Edwin Bakker and Beatrice de Graaf, “Preventing Lone Wolf Terrorism: Some CT Approaches 
Addressed,” Perspectives On Terrorism vol. 5, no. 5–6 (December 2011), 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/preventing-lone-wolf/334, 46. 
 27 
                                                 
the technology revolution. If all the enemy’s secrets are digital, then that is where 
intelligence should focus its efforts. The lone wolf is largely protected from this method 
of collection though.49 If there are no conversations then none can be intercepted. If the 
content of radical websites is freely known to all then the intelligence community may be 
able to obtain that information but has great difficulty ascertaining who else obtains it as 
well. With no direct hierarchical command structure, less technical means of collection 
such as human intelligence (HUMINT) are put at a large disadvantage as well.50 Overall, 
this lack of command structure and limited communication means that lone-wolf 
terrorists are truly insulated from most traditional methods of intelligence collection and 
if the United States hopes to detect and prevent such attacks in the future, non-traditional 
means will need to be employed. 
C. CASE STUDIES OF LONE WOLVES 
Both Becker and Teich, in their works cited earlier, have compiled comprehensive 
databases of lone-wolf attacks upon U.S. soil over the past several decades and have been 
able to extrapolate some useful trends associated with lone-wolf terrorists as well as 
dispelling some commonly held, but incorrect, assumptions. Below are a selection of case 
studies which highlight the findings of those two comprehensive studies. These case 
studies call attention to the advantages lone-wolf terrorists possess, the challenges posed 
to traditional intelligence methods of identification, and potential means of detecting 
these lone-wolf terrorists. 
Timothy McVeigh, the perpetrator of one of the deadliest terrorist attacks against 
the United States, serves as a good first example of a lone wolf because his development, 
radicalization, and methodology are so consistent with what experts have found to be a 
typical lone-wolf terrorist. McVeigh, a loner since childhood, due in large part to 
disinterested and inattentive parents and a trend of being bullied by peers, sought a sense 
of belonging from multiple different sources but maintained a loner’s lifestyle. This 
49 Barnes, “Confronting the One-Man Wolf Pack,” 1637–1638. 
50 Erik J. Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and 
Beyond (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 168–169. 
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isolation developed to the point of purchasing land in New York for a survivalist bunker 
and eschewing traditional romantic pursuits.51 While enlisted in the Army, one of the 
places McVeigh came closest to developing a social aspect, he continued the disturbing 
trend of extreme self-sufficiency and survivalist preparation. This was taken to the point 
that he “rented a storage shed in nearby Junction City, and just as he had done at his 
father’s home back in Pendleton, he kept one hundred gallons of fresh water there, along 
with guns, ammunition, MRE rations, and other supplies.”52 
Disenchanted with life in the Army after failing to qualify for the Special Forces, 
McVeigh left the military and returned home to a dead-end job and became enraged at 
the system for failing him. During this time, he began to write anti-government letters to 
local newspapers.53 Additionally, McVeigh became immersed in the gun show culture 
and recruited old Army buddies Terry Nichols and Michael Fortier to help sell items at 
these shows as a side business. During these years, McVeigh became more disillusioned 
with the federal government over their handling of the Ruby Ridge and Waco incidents 
and felt that U.S. citizens were oblivious to the inevitable restrictions on their rights. 
McVeigh came to trust Nichols and Fortier and eventually hatched a plan to bomb the 
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma in order to combat the 
federal government. McVeigh and his accomplices bought or stole the components for 
the bomb, and traveled great distances to acquire them. Paranoid of being discovered, 
McVeigh wrote to family members about his concerns of being surveilled by ‘G-men’.54 
After assembling the bomb in Geary Lake, Kansas, McVeigh drove it to the Federal 
Building in Oklahoma City and detonated it from a distance. 
Mohamed Osman Mohamud, a 19-year-old Somali-American man who plotted in 
2010 to blow up a car bomb at an Oregon Christmas tree lighting ceremony in Portland 
51 Dale Russakoff and Serge Kovaleski, “An Ordinary Boy’s Extraordinary Rage; After a Long Search 
for Order, Timothy McVeigh Finally Found a World He Could Fit Into,” The Washington Post, July 2, 
1995, A1. 
52 Lou Michel and Dan Herbeck, American Terrorist (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2001), 70. 
53 Michel and Herbeck, American Terrorist, 118. 
54 Brandon Stickney, All-American Monster: The Unauthorized Biography of Timothy McVeigh (New 
York: Prometheus Books, 1996), 65. 
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serves as another typical example of a lone-wolf perpetrator. An 18 year old college 
student with separated parents, Mohamud lacked many friends growing up and, in high 
school, reached out to the extremist jihad community in an effort to belong to a larger 
cause. He originally wrote physical fitness articles for the extremist magazine Jihad 
Recollections but quickly expressed a desire to be more directly involved with the 
cause.55 FBI officials were “tipped from someone concerned about him”56 and 
intercepted an e-mail exchange between Mohamud and a known terrorist recruiter living 
in Pakistan. After repeated failed attempts by Mohamud to contact a third party for 
assistance in traveling to Pakistan, the FBI spoofed the third party’s e-mail address and 
contacted Mohamud. Recording all their interactions, the FBI provides much evidence of 
Mohamud’s disengagement from society and his path towards terrorism.57 An individual 
who wanted to take a stand and be part of something larger than himself, Mohamud 
attempted to detonate a car bomb which would have killed and injured hundreds of 
people had the FBI not intervened. 
Zachary Chesser, an intelligent and successful student in Fairfax, Virginia, 
confessed to, and was found guilty of, aiding the terrorist organization Al-Shabaab.58 The 
child of divorced parents, Chesser was seen as a well-rounded and sociable young man 
by his high school classmates and teachers. Chesser was exposed to Islam when he dated 
a Muslim peer. Once exposed, Chesser explored Islam through the Internet and immersed 
himself in the ideals and beliefs of the more radical Islamic groups. Expanding his 
involvement at a fast pace, Chesser was an active member of at least six different jihadist 
websites and chat forums. This behavior caught the attention of Jarret Brachman, a 
terrorism scholar, who engaged Chesser in conversation and coined the term ‘jihobbyist’ 
for people such as him, who are fascinated by Islam or jihad but were not members of 
55 Bob Drogin and April Choi, “Teen Held in Alleged Portland Bomb Plot,” Los Angeles Times, 
November 28, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/28/nation/la-na-portland-bomb-plot-20101128.  
56 Ibid. 
57 U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, “Arrest Warrant: United States of America v. 
Mohamed Osman Mohamud,” Oregon Live, November 26, 2010, 
http://media.oregonlive.com/portland_impact/other/USAFFIDAVIT.pdf, 3–9. 
58 Suzanne Kelly, “A Classic Case of Self-Radicalizing,” CNN, February 28, 2012, 
http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/02/28/a-classic-case-of-self-radicalizing/.  
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recognized terrorist organizations.59 Friends and family members noticed Chesser’s 
views becoming more extreme. Additionally, in April 2010, Chesser wrote an email to 
Fox News, stating that he sought to “raise awareness of the correct understanding of key 
Islamic beliefs.” In it he stated, “If you kill us, then we kill you.”60 Chesser set up several 
successful jihadist websites and a YouTube station dedicated to radical Islamic topics. 
Also in April 2010, Chesser warned via email the creators of South Park, Trey Parker and 
Matt Stone, of violent retribution for their depictions of Muhammad in their often 
irreverent cartoon. The post included the business addresses of likely targets of 
retribution, including Comedy Central as well as Parker and Stone’s production 
company.61 On July 10, 2010, Chesser was arrested while in the process of boarding a 
flight to Somalia. He told federal agents that he intended to train with Al-Shabaab, the 
terrorist organization in order to pursue further jihadist activities. 
Looking at these three examples of lone-wolf terrorists, one can see several 
similarities and draw several general conclusions. First among these is that the lone-wolf 
mindset tends to be fostered over a long period of time. Humans are naturally social 
creatures and the process of developing a person into a non-social entity is not a fast one. 
Even with Zachary Chesser, who was the most quickly developed lone wolf in the case 
studies, it took several years from first contact with radical ideals to being considered a 
lone-wolf terrorist. In the case of Timothy McVeigh, the development of lone-wolf 
tendencies can be seen as far back as his early childhood. Obviously, not all neglected or 
socially backward individuals will resort to lone-wolf terrorism, but it is a strong 
prerequisite for the typology.  
The second trend seen in these case studies and in the overall examination of 
lone-wolf terrorists is that they tend to show a much higher rate of psychological 
disturbances than other terrorists.62 Statistically, terrorists in traditional hierarchical 
59 Jarret Brachman, Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice (London: Taylor and Francis Group, 2009). 
60 Joshua Rhett Miller, “Road to Radicalism: The Man Behind the ‘South Park’ Threats,” Fox News, 
April 30, 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/04/23/road-radicalism-man-south-park-threats/.  
61 Tom Lister, “Radical Islamic Website takes on ‘South Park’,” CNN, April 19, 2010, 
http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2010/04/19/security-brief-radical-islamic-web-site-takes-on-south-park/.  
62 Becker, “Explaining Lone Wolf Target Selection,” 962. 
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groups show no higher incident of psychological problems than the public at large. Not 
surprisingly, lone wolves have a much higher rate of exhibiting such psychological 
problems as paranoia, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and severe depression.63 As with 
the issue of socially withdrawn individuals, not all people with the psychological 
problems listed above are going to develop into lone-wolf terrorists; however, these 
psychological issues do appear to be another strong prerequisite for lone-wolf behavior. 
Another trend that emerges from these case studies is the tendency of lone-wolf 
terrorists to provide signals of their intent prior to attacks. McVeigh wrote letters to local 
media with extremist viewpoints and contacted family members about paranoid 
suspicions. Chesser threatened the individuals he intended to target and, after the fact, his 
family members noted his withdrawal and change in personality over the preceding years. 
Of the three, Mohamud did the least telegraphing of his intentions of terrorist activities. 
His friends and family were surprised after his arrest since he appeared to be sociable and 
happy in his life. His example serves as a counterpoint and reminder that there is no rote 
path to lone-wolf terrorism. Becker and Teich’s overall studies do show that the trend 
among lone-wolf terrorists is to provide clues to their violent intents in some form or 
manner. This trend is less compelling than either of the previous ones discussed but is 
still statistically significant. Highlighting this, Teich argues that lone-wolf terrorism, “is 
most difficult to prevent when the attacker has no contact whatsoever with other 
extremists – Pantucci’s loners were seen to be the most successful at carrying out terrorist 
attacks.”64 Even those lone wolves that did provide clues prior to their attack did so in a 
much more subtle and less detectable manner than a traditional terrorist group. Often, 
lone wolves only transmit such clues to family or close friends, though there are cases 
such as McVeigh and Chesser in which the media or targets were contacted. 
One typically held belief that can be dispelled by these case studies is the notion 
that all lone wolves are extreme recluses who completely eschew human contact in any 
form. While some such as McVeigh or Ted Kaczynski, the Unibomber, largely adhere to 
this preconception, the majority, though awkward in their social interactions, tend to have 
63 Spaaij, “Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism,” 862. 
64 Teich, “Trends and Developments in Lone Wolf Terrorism,” 22. 
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some sort of social network. Usually limited in scope, these networks are present none 
the less. This insight is important because it dispels the notion that lone-wolf terrorism 
cannot be prevented. In fact, Teich states that, “even though [lone wolves] are 
unaffiliated and thus harder to trace, their attacks are preventable.” Becker expands on 
this notion in his conclusion by arguing that, “lone wolves are what might be called 
‘weak opportunists’. Lone wolves exhibit a propensity to strike at the intersection of their 
ideology and their daily routines … this tendency implies a special role for communities 
and local law enforcement agencies in monitoring at-risk individuals.”65 This is echoed 
by professional law enforcement such as Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe, commissioner of 
London’s Metropolitan Police Service, when he stated that, “Although they’re said to be 
lone wolves, they usually know someone who cares for them or they’re in contact with, 
and those people will notice that type of change of behavior.”66 As such, clues about a 
pending lone-wolf attack will more likely be received by local citizens within a lone 
wolf’s community than through national electronic surveillance efforts. This difference in 
signals means a different method of receiving those signals by authorities needs to be 
implemented. 
D. CURRENT EFFORTS TO COMBAT LONE-WOLF TERRORISM 
Law enforcement officials are not ignorant to the difference in indicators between 
lone-wolf terrorists and traditional hierarchical group attacks and have attempted to adapt 
their intelligence collection to this emerging threat. It is true that these new efforts have 
resulted in an evolution in intelligence actions by law enforcement and have seen a 
commensurate increase in prevention of lone-wolf terrorist incidents. Yet most of these 
innovations still adhere to an institutional tendency of top-down collection and as a result, 
suffer some of the same limitations as traditional intelligence methods. 
One of the most common, successful, and widely publicized reforms in domestic 
intelligence is known as community outreach or community policing. Community 
outreach seeks to build trust within at-risk communities and develop cooperation with 
65 Becker, “Explaining Lone Wolf Target Selection,” 971. 
66 Hays, “Lone-Wolf Terror Threat.” 
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community members while simultaneously presenting counter-radical narratives.67 
Colloquially known as a return to the “beat cop,” it emphasizes personal interaction 
between law enforcement and the communities they patrol. While a step in the right 
direction, this effort suffers limitations similar to other top-down methods of collecting 
information. Specifically, the resource investment, of both time and manpower, grows 
exponentially with any desired increases in coverage. This is because each beat cop is 
canvassing an area and pulling information from the citizens. They are individually 
establishing relationships with shop owners and community leaders, which takes time and 
effort. While these efforts have been shown to pay off, they will never be able to reach 
down to the level needed to canvass the majority of citizens in an area. While the most 
visible individuals, such as the store owners and community leaders, are being interacted 
with, the vast majority of citizens are not. The average stay-at-home mother, factory 
worker, or high school student will not develop a relationship with a beat cop executing 
community engagement because they are not one of the most visible and easily accessible 
community members. This limited community penetration results in large swaths of the 
population who will not receive the engagement of local law enforcement.68 As such, 
these individuals will be left uncovered by this form of domestic intelligence gathering. 
Traditional electronic surveillance has experienced an evolution of its own in 
response to increasingly insular nature of terrorist attacks. This has included broader 
mandates to collect on domestic targets such as the PRISM program and meta-data 
collection of cell phone calls as well as the non-standard approach of social media and 
chat room data scraping. Once again, the goal is to reach further into the fabric of U.S. 
society in an effort to identify potential threats earlier and prevent attacks on the 
populace. Unfortunately, electronic surveillance provides much larger amounts of data 
than can be processed at a central location. Analyzing every Tweet, Facebook post, and 
e-mail sent is too large a task. This fire hose of data can only be managed effectively 
when it is narrowly focused on an already identified target of interest and does poorly at 
67 Barnes, “Confronting the One-Man Wolf Pack,” 1634. 
68 Jerome H. Skolnick and David H. Bayley, “Community Policing: Issues and Practices Around the 
World,” National Institute of Justice: Issues and Practices, May 24, 1988, 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/111428NCJRS.pdf, 86. 
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wide canvassing for initial indicators.69 This means that it provides an excellent tool of 
tracking and understanding an already identified person of interest but does little in 
helping with the initial identification of those individuals. 
The various “See Something, Say Something” campaigns and associated tip lines 
is another emerging technique to reach further into society and extract the subtle 
indicators of lone-wolf activity. It is one of the most innovative and potentially useful 
methods seen so far. This effort relies on the grassroots ideal of pushing information from 
the masses up with small amounts of law enforcement interaction and oversight required 
when compared to community outreach. Assumed and expanded by DHS in 2010, after 
the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority demonstrated it as a proof of 
concept, the See Something, Say Something campaign is designed to raise national public 
awareness of the indicators of terrorism and to encourage the public to report such 
indicators.70 The biggest potential gains from a program such as this is the grassroots, 
ground up approach to acquiring information that can be turned into timely and 
actionable intelligence. By connecting the lowest level, the individual citizen, the 
program has the potential to exponentially expand the number of people monitoring the 
situation in the U.S. homeland.  
Unfortunately, the See Something, Say Something program suffers from a few 
roadblocks that make its effectiveness less than optimal. First and foremost, the program 
is not well known by the public. A recent Gallup poll showed that fewer than half of U.S. 
citizens have even heard of the See Something, Say Something program. Additionally, 
less than twenty-five percent could accurately identify what the program was designed to 
do.71 If most of the nation does not know the program’s purpose or that it even exists, 
then the likelihood of the public knowing whom to contact and what information is 
pertinent is even lower. Even if we were to assume all of the U.S. public was aware of the 
69 Barnes, “Confronting the One-Man Wolf Pack,” 1638. 
70 Department of Homeland Security, “If You See Something, Say Something,” accessed May 23, 
2014, http://www.dhs.gov/if-you-see-something-say-something.  
71 Steve Ander and Art Swift, “See Something, Say Something: Unfamiliar to Most Americans,” 
Gallup Politics, December 23, 2014, http://www.gallup.com/poll/166622/something-say-something-
unfamiliar-americans.aspx.  
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program, knew its purpose, and knew how to contact officials with information, it is still 
inhibited by a relatively high cost of participation for the citizen. Specifically, the time it 
would take to track down a police officer or research the correct local hotline to call for a 
suspicious event is likely to dissuade an individual from doing so. The fact that the 
program is very local in nature raises the cost of participation as well. Every city and 
region has a different hotline to call and has different requirements for information to 
provide. Even the most revolutionary part of the See Something, Say Something effort, 
reporting via mobile applications, has been diluted by this same localization and low 
exposure. Several mobile applications, such as New Jersey Office of Homeland Security 
and Preparedness’ SAFE-NJ, excel technically, but receive only limited advertisement 
and explanation to the public. Additionally, a person commuting from Trenton, New 
Jersey to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania would need to use three different apps, with three 
different user interfaces, reporting to three different law enforcement agencies over the 
course of 30 miles. This localization of the initiative means that a method of reporting 
that a resident of Buffalo is familiar with is unlikely to apply should they visit New York 
City or other areas. The lack of awareness and high cost of participation have combined 
to make the See Something, Say Something program largely ineffective. 
That being said, the idea behind and basic nature of the See Something, Say 
Something program has great potential if instituted correctly. The challenges it has faced 
are not intrinsic to the program itself but stem rather from poor funding, ineffective 
public relations campaigns, and implementation which fails to address the needs of either 
law enforcement or the citizens. The See Something, Say Something program’s setbacks 
can illustrate quite clearly what steps need to be taken in the future to make such citizen-
centric domestic intelligence efforts more successful. Specifically, it will need to be 
widely publicized and readily adopted by a large percentage of the population. It must be 
easy to use by the average citizen and require minimal time investment by participants. It 
will have to intrinsically engage the users in a manner that makes them want to 
participate in the program. Each of these solutions will be addressed in later chapters of 
the thesis in more depth but are mentioned here to illustrate the potential this already-
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developed domestic intelligence program has in using crowdsourcing to combat lone-
wolf terrorists. 
This chapter examined the lone-wolf terrorist, its evolution from hierarchical 
terrorist groups, and the advantages and disadvantage inherent to lone-wolf tactics. It also 
examined the difficulties faced by law enforcement and intelligence services in detecting 
lone-wolf operators. Next, several case studies in which lone-wolf tactics were used by 
terrorists were laid out in an effort to identify early indicators of potential lone-wolf 
actions. The chapter concluded with an examination of current methods of identifying 
and preventing lone-wolf terrorists that are being implemented by law enforcement 
agencies in the United States. Deficiencies in the identification process inherent to both 
the current methods and proposed traditional solutions were explored. In summary, there 
are gaps in the traditional domestic intelligence system which lone-wolf terrorists, 
through their very nature, are able to more easily exploit to avoid detection than the 
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III. CROWDSOURCING: LESSONS FROM COMMERCIAL 
APPLICATIONS 
Yale University’s Yochai Benkler states that industry “understands the world is 
becoming too fast, too complex and too networked for any company to have all the 
answers inside.”72 It is for this very reason that an increasing number of companies are 
turning to crowdsourcing as a way to innovate and solve problems at a pace and success 
rate never seen before. Crowdsourcing is a tool that holds promise not only for private 
enterprise but for any entity wishing to use it. This chapter addresses exactly what 
crowdsourcing is, why it is useful, and what problems it excels at solving. Case studies 
from several successful crowdsourcing endeavors will be examined to determine the 
qualities which have allowed them to succeed and contrasting their success with some 
instances in which crowdsourcing failed. Once the advantages and disadvantages of 
crowdsourcing have been examined, its applicability to domestic intelligence is examined 
to determine if crowdsourcing is a viable tool in detecting lone-wolf terrorist threats. 
A. WHY CROWDSOURCING IS RELEVANT 
Before addressing the question of how crowdsourcing can be used to collect 
domestic intelligence to stop lone-wolf terrorists, one must first address a more basic and 
underlying issue. Specifically, is using information willingly provided by the population 
at large a sound intelligence methodology? There are many in the intelligence field who 
would view such efforts as pointless since they believe that if a piece of information is 
not secret, then it is not intelligence. For them, intelligence is the process of collecting 
information known only to the adversary and to the intelligence experts, and which there 
is reasonable certainty that the adversary is unaware of the intelligence experts’ 
possession of such knowledge. Under this view, whole domains of intelligence such as 
Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) are considered useless since the information is freely 
72 Adam Davidson, “Big Firms Eye ‘Open Innovation’ for Ideas,” National Public Radio, May 27, 
2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10480377.  
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available to most of the population and because the adversary can be reasonably assured 
that the intelligence experts possess the information.73 
It is certainly true that the value of intelligence increases inversely with the 
number of people who know it. Known only to a few, intelligence can be of much greater 
value than if the same information were widely disseminated. One only need consider 
industrial capabilities of countries engaged in economic negotiations to realize that there 
is still much intelligence value even for widely known pieces of information. In those 
same economic negotiations, knowledge of the other county’s industrial capabilities is 
still a useful bargaining chip even when the other country is aware the knowledge is 
available to both parties. 
In the end though, whether information provided by the population can be 
considered intelligence is largely a moot point since it is still valuable information for a 
variety of reasons, whether considered intelligence or not. The Times Square bombing of 
2010 was prevented by a local street vendor tip to law enforcement.74 In 2014, an 
intended school massacre in Waseca, Minnesota, was thwarted by a stay-at-home mother 
who saw suspicious activity through her kitchen window.75 In 2002, bystander 
information from multiple sources, including a priest and a truck driver, directly led to 
the localization of the Beltway Snipers.76  These real-world events provide proof of the 
usefulness of citizen intelligence in detecting and preventing lone-wolf terrorism.  
Foremost, using the U.S. citizenry as intelligence collectors expands the domestic 
intelligence network exponentially. In 2008, the population of the United States was over 
304 million people with approximately 765,000 law enforcement officers employed in 
73 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2012), 112–
113. 
74 Alison Gendar , Rocco Parascandola , Kevin Deutsch , and Samuel Goldsmith, “Time Square Car 
Bomb: Cops Evacuate Heart of NYC After Potential Terrorist Attack,” New York Daily News, May 1, 
2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/time-square-car-bomb-cops-evacuate-heart-nyc-potential-
terrorist-attack-article-1.444423.  
75 Pat Pheifer, “Waseca Teen Accused in School Shooting Plot had been Planning for Months,” Star 
Tribune, May 10, 2014, http://www.startribune.com/local/257505631.html.  
76 Rona Kobell, “For Sniper Tipster, Small Rewards,” The Baltimore Sun, December 13, 2003, 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2003–12–13/news/0312130235_1_montgomery-county-donahue-sniper.  
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the United States during the same time.77 This provides coverage of approximately one 
officer for every 400 people nationwide. Additionally, as of October 31, 2013, the FBI 
employed a total of 35,344 people, only 13,598 of which were special agents. If only 10 
percent78 of the U.S. population participated in crowdsourced domestic intelligence 
collection, it would represent coverage and community penetration forty times the level 
achievable using only law enforcement to collect the same intelligence. This 
pervasiveness is needed to detect the much more subtle signals which lone-wolf terrorists 
provide and which they tend to distribute to a much smaller group of people. 
Not only does citizen collection of intelligence increase the pervasiveness of 
intelligence for law enforcement, it also greatly enhances the persistence of collection. A 
law enforcement officer conducting community outreach will only be able to reach a 
limited subset of high-visibility individuals in a given community. Each interaction the 
officer performs will be limited in scope and time based on limited time and resources 
allocated to such efforts. Contrast this with individuals in the community who are 
constantly embedded and, for approximately sixteen hours a day, are conscious observers 
of their surroundings and fellow citizens. This persistence is crucial because it gives the 
collector a higher likelihood of detecting signals of impending attacks and provides them 
more familiarity with their surroundings. This naturally leads to the final advantage of 
using citizens for collection: local expertise. 
Local expertise is important because it is only by knowing what is normal or 
belongs in an area that a person can then determine what is out of place. To an individual 
thrown into a foreign land for the first time, everything appears new and out of place 
because they are unfamiliar with local methods and traditions and they carry 
preconceived notions with them of what they consider normal from their own culture. 
Likewise, officers patrolling a neighborhood that they are not a member of may not 
77 United States Census Bureau, Population Estimates, October 09, 2012, 
http://www.census.gov/popest/data/intercensal/national/nat2010.html. 
  Brian Reaves, “Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2008,” Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, July 2011, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf.  
78 Charles Arthur, “What is the 1% rule?,” The Guardian, July 19, 2006, 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2006/jul/20/guardianweeklytechnologysection2.  
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notice things that are out of place. Additionally, because they are viewed as outsiders, 
local citizens may be less forthcoming with information or act more guarded around law 
enforcement than they might with other local citizens. As such, local citizens will be able 
to get a more accurate view of what is normal for a community and are more likely to be 
given unguarded access to people’s actions and thoughts. This combination of 
pervasiveness, persistence, and local expertise make the concept of using local citizens 
for domestic intelligence collection very attractive. 
In this respect, crowdsourcing should be seen as a tool to achieve this citizen 
collected domestic intelligence strategy rather than a strategy in and of itself. 
Crowdsourcing is, “an online, distributed problem-solving and production model that 
leverages the collective intelligence of online communities to serve specific 
organizational goals. Online communities, also called crowds, are given the opportunity 
to respond to crowdsourcing activities promoted by the organization, and they are 
motivated to respond for a variety of reasons.”79 Broken into its basic components, 
scholars have reached an agreement that for a task to be considered crowdsourcing, it 
must have the following four key ingredients: an organization with a task which needs 
performing, a community that is willing to perform the task voluntarily, an online 
environment that allows interaction and work to take place, and mutual benefit to both 
the organization and community.80 
Soliciting a large group of people for ideas and information is nothing new. “In 
1714, the British established a commission offering 20,000 pounds (roughly $12 million 
today) to anyone who could invent a way to determine longitude on a sailing vessel.”81 
Top scientific minds of the time, including Isaac Newton, had failed. The solution, an 
extremely precise clock, was developed by an uneducated cabinetmaker from Yorkshire. 
Crowdsourcing, according to Brabham’s definition, is a phenomenon that is related but 
much more specific. Specifically, crowdsourcing deals exclusively with collaboration 
through the Internet. No other medium is able to link such a wide array of people at all 
79 Brabham, Crowdsourcing, xix. 
80 Ibid., 3. 
81 Howe, Crowdsourcing, 146–147. 
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levels so quickly, efficiently, and tightly as the Internet. Additionally, the Internet comes 
closest to providing an environment for true meritocracy. On the Internet, what a person 
looks like or sounds like no longer matters. The only thing that holds value is the content 
of a person’s ideas. The ability to quickly and easily build a large community with an 
intrinsic anonymity provides the ideal environment for distributed collaboration in a way 
never seen before. 
Under the broad definition of crowdsourcing, several sub-categories emerge that 
help experts better define specific endeavors into the realm. Several scholars have created 
different categorizations based on competing factors such as the type of organization 
employing crowdsourcing, size of community, or length of project. Brabham takes a 
different approach and develops a typology of crowdsourcing based on what, in general 
terms, the project is setting out to accomplish. This is the most useful definition and is the 
typology used in this thesis. Brabham breaks crowdsourcing into four distinct types: 
knowledge discovery and management, broadcast search, peer-vetted creative production, 
and distributed human-intelligence tasking.82 
Of these four categories, knowledge discovery and management as well as 
distributed human-intelligence tasking will be relevant to the crowdsourcing of domestic 
intelligence. The other two deal with the creation of new products or solving of empirical 
problems, neither of which intelligence collection and processing fits into. Knowledge 
discovery and management tasks a crowd with finding and collecting information into a 
common location and format.83 This would be analogous to calling several people and 
asking them what the weather is at their location in order to gain a picture of the current 
climate conditions across a wide region. The mobile navigation application Waze will be 
used as the case study for this type of crowdsourcing. It should serve as guidance for the 
portion of crowdsourcing domestic intelligence which interfaces with the U.S. citizenry 
and will provide insight on how to gainfully engage the community for such tasks. 
82 Brabham, Crowdsourcing, 45. 
83 Ibid. 
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Distributed human-intelligence tasking asks a crowd to analyze large amounts of 
information in cases where human intelligence is more efficient or effective than 
computer analysis.84 Pattern recognition, audio transcription, and picture identification 
are all tasks which fall into this category and which are among the tasks performed by 
people participating in Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). MTurk will therefore be 
used as the second case study of crowdsourcing in the private sector. It will provide a 
template for the backend of a crowdsourced domestic intelligence effort by highlighting 
key ways to process information which is typically difficult for automated systems. 
The third case study, DARPA’s Ten Red Balloons experiment, though not strictly 
commercial in nature, has a large amount of relevance to domestic intelligence. The 
experiment highlighted the huge gains in speed and efficiency in locating difficult to find 
and geographically distributed objects through the use of crowdsourcing. The lessons 
learned from Ten Red Balloons should reinforce the strengths of crowdsourcing and 
provide as near a direct real-life example of crowdsourcing domestic intelligence as is 
currently available. 
B. CASE STUDIES OF CROWDSOURCING 
Waze, a mobile navigation application for use on smart phones, was launched in 
2008 and quickly became one of the most successful navigation applications on the 
market. So much so that in 2013, Waze’s largest competitor, Google, purchased Waze 
Ltd for $966 million.85 Waze is set apart from the myriad of other navigation applications 
available commercially by its crowdsourcing components. The utilization of 
crowdsourcing has enabled it to be more accurate and adaptable than its competitors and 
has been directly attributed to its huge success.86 At its most basic level, Waze 
participants passively provide data to central servers about their current location and 
speed. Using this data, Waze is able to provide real-time information on traffic flow and 
84 Ibid. 
85 Dara Kerr, “Google Reveals It Spent $966 Million in Waze Acquisition,” CNET, July 25, 2013, 
http://www.cnet.com/news/google-reveals-it-spent-966-million-in-waze-acquisition/.  




                                                 
congestion for a covered region, highlighting slowdowns with yellow and standstills with 
red. Additionally, algorithms within Waze can use this data to route motorists around 
heavily congested areas and provide the most efficient commute possible. When Waze 
initially expands into an area it also uses this passively-provided user data to verify pre-
existing, and usually dated, map data. Waze will display Pac-man like dots on any 
unverified roadways for users to drive over. Driving on them provides users with points 
and provides the database verification that the road is still passable. 
This passive collection of data only scratches the surface of Waze’s 
crowdsourcing abilities. Waze also allows the community to participate in a much more 
active manner. A driver, through a few quick taps, may log such traffic incidents as 
accidents, debris on the road, police, or inclement weather. Participants are awarded 
points and the data is fed into central servers and distributed to all other Waze users in the 
area. When nearing any of these user-generated alerts, Waze gives the other users the 
option of either confirming its existence or reporting the condition resolved. This peer 
review allows continuous updates while simultaneously self-policing errant reports. 
Using this system, users can easily see which alerts have been most recently updated and 
which ones have the most confirmations from other users. This provides instant graphical 
feedback to all users on the validity of any alert in their area. 
At the most involved level, users can log into the Waze system on a computer and 
make a formal report on road changes. This can include anything from a newly 
constructed roadway or a closure of a semi-permanent nature. This interaction requires 
review by Waze personnel but can be verified and incorporated into the Waze database in 
less than five days. Bradley Horowitz postulated the 1:10:89 rule, which states that for 
any crowdsourcing effort, 1 out of 100 people will fall into this deep-use category, 10 out 
of 100 will vote on content and participate at a shallow level, while 89 out of 100 will 
simply consume the content developed by others.87 This deep level of participation by 
the one percent rewards them with unique avatars and badges which are unavailable any 
other way. There are additional and very powerful intrinsic motivations in play as well. 
87 Howe, Crowdsourcing, 227. 
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When one power-user was asked why he spent 50 hours a week for almost two years 
helping to map the country with 378,000 edits to maps for free, he responded by saying, 
“You feel good about knowing that the people who drive around every day save time 
because you are investing your time in fixing the roads and doing this mapping.”88 
The points, levels, and avatars listed above are all forms of gamification, “the use 
of game thinking and game mechanics in non-game contexts to engage users in solving 
problems,”89 and they are integral to Waze’s model of operation. By providing users with 
virtual awards and recognition for performing tasks which are mundane but beneficial to 
the company and the community, they are incentivizing users to work for the company at 
a very low cost. Giving a user’s avatar a crown for reporting a certain number of traffic 
incidents costs Waze nothing but it provides the user a representation of his 
accomplishment, which he can see and which his fellow participants can see and covet as 
well. This award system spurs further participation and if done correctly, can help 
overcome one of the most common problems most crowdsourcing projects encounter, 
reaching a critical mass of participants to make the project viable. 
Waze, and many other crowdsourcing projects, have implemented social media 
integration to also assist in building a user base.90 The grassroots nature of 
crowdsourcing means that word of mouth is usually the predominant form of marketing 
and social media can turn provide this word of mouth a megaphone to get the message 
out. Waze links to a user’s Facebook account and allows direct competition for new 
badges and awards between people who know each other in real life rather than just 
providing an arbitrary ranking on a global leader board. Users linked through Facebook 
are also able to send each other messages via Waze and synchronize travel to a common 
destination by viewing each other’s estimated time of arrival. By integrating social 
media, Waze has made the gamification more personal for the user and thereby ensuring 
88 Matt McFarland, “Why Waze is so incredibly popular in Costa Rica,” The Washington Post, 
October 24, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/innovations/wp/2014/10/27/why-waze-is-so-
incredibly-popular-in-costa-rica/.  
89 Deterding, “From Game Design Elements to Gamefulness,” 10. 
90 Roy Furchgott, “Filling in Map Gaps With Waze Games,” The New York Times, May 6, 2010, 
http://wheels.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/06/filling-in-the-map-gaps-with-waze-games/.  
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wider and more frequent participation.91 Further case studies will show this building of a 
community with interaction and transparency to be one of the biggest factors in making a 
crowdsourcing project successful. Should it adopt a crowdsourced domestic intelligence 
effort, this will present the intelligence community, known for its closed nature and lack 
of public interaction, with one of its biggest challenges. 
Launched by Amazon in 2005, Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is a crowdsourcing 
project designed to harness human computation ability to perform tasks which computers 
are ill-suited for.92 MTurk was originally used in-house by Amazon to cull duplicate 
descriptions of items sold on their website. They then expanded its application by 
allowing outside entities to solicit jobs to be completed by MTurk participants. These 
jobs vary from photo identification, to transcription, or survey completion. Most are tasks 
which computers are ill-suited at, such as determining a pepperoni pizza from a cheese 
pizza in a picture.93 Additionally, each individual task tends to be very short in duration. 
This microtasking philosophy allows businesses to harness people’s spare time while 
benefiting the individuals with a minor secondary income and a sense of 
accomplishment.94 Organizations submit job requests through the MTurk website and 
participants can then select jobs from the listings which they feel particularly suited for or 
interested in. Once complete the originating entity reviews participant’s work and either 
accepts or rejects it. A participant’s acceptance rating can then guide follow-on entities in 
accepting participants with a proven track record for their tasks. This community 
feedback is critical in ensuring that a high quality is maintained. 
MTurk differs from Waze in that the reward is extrinsic, in the form of monetary 
payments, rather than intrinsic. This extrinsic reward system gives MTurk an advantage 
in workers accepting a task and increasing the speed with which it is completed; 
however, research has concluded that these extrinsic rewards have no bearing on the 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ellen Cushing, “Amazon Mechanical Turk: The Digital Sweatshop,” Utne Reader, January 2013, 
http://www.utne.com/science-and-technology/amazon-mechanical-turk-
zm0z13jfzlin.aspx#axzz3HvYkp0Uo.  
93 Basulto, “Humans Are the World’s Best Pattern-Recognition Machines.” 
94 Cushing, “Amazon Mechanical Turk.” 
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quality of work done.95 Rather, problems typically framed with intrinsic rewards, such as 
helping others, are shown to have higher quality work associated with them. Most 
importantly, the researchers found a synergistic interaction between intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivators. Combining extrinsic and intrinsic rewards has been shown to 
increase the acceptance rates for tasks as well as producing higher quality outputs.96 
These findings translate to other crowdsourcing projects and can help guide a 
crowdsourced domestic intelligence effort in attracting participants and encouraging a 
high quality of inputs from those participants. MTurk’s ability to harness human 
processing also shows promise for crowdsourcing some of the initial analysis of 
intelligence data, not just collection. Peer review of submitted alerts could provide 
reinforcement for a valid alerts importance and help cull inputs with less relevance. 
The final case study of a successful crowdsourcing project is not of a commercial 
nature. DARPA’s Ten Red Balloons experiment in human networking was launched in 
December of 2009 by the government organization as a way to explore the roles the 
Internet and social networking play in real-world communication and collaboration.97 In 
the competition for a $40,000 prize, teams had to locate ten red balloons placed around 
the United States and then report their findings to DARPA. The contest creators 
intentionally left the format and methodology of the search vague in order to push such 
decisions down to the participants. Strictly speaking, neither teams nor social networking 
needed to be used by participants, though all the top competitors used both heavily. The 
winning team, a group of 5 students from MIT who found out about the competition four 
days prior to it starting, provides an excellent example of the power crowdsourcing brings 
to bear on such real-world problems. The MIT team found all ten balloons in less than 
95 Jakob Rogstadius, Vassilis Kostakos, Aniket Kittur, Boris Smus, Jim Laredo, and Maja Vukovic, 
“An Assessment of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation on Task Performance in Crowdsourcing Markets,” 
Proceedings of the Fifth International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media, July 05, 2011, 
http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/ICWSM/ICWSM11/paper/viewFile/2778/3295, 321.  
96 Ibid. 
97 Doug Gross, “MIT Wins $40,000 Prize in Nationwide Balloon-Hunt Contest,” CNN, December 07, 
2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/12/05/darpa.balloon.challenge/index.html?_s=PM:TECH.  
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nine hours, a task which DARPA had estimated would take approximately two weeks.98 
Developing a pyramid scheme method of reward, the team allocated half the prize money 
to those individuals who gave them proof of the locations of the ten balloons and then 
used the other half of the prize money to reward those individuals who referred the 
balloon finders to the competition, those who referred the referrer, and so on in 
decreasing increments. This method of reward created motivation for a self-propagating 
network of individuals with a motivation to not only search for the balloons but to also 
recruit other individuals to the project. This method of recruitment is very effective in 
building a motivated and involved user base very quickly. 
Closely related to the DARPA Ten Red Balloon experiment is another experiment 
conducted by Wired Magazine in which a reporter attempted to remain hidden from 
public view for a month.99 This contest also offered a monetary prize and also left the 
methods of competition purposely vague. Once again, individuals self-organized into 
teams which coordinated using social media and the Internet.100 The winning team was 
able to locate and confront the reporter with their findings in 25 days, an astonishing feat 
considering the boundaries of the search were the continental United States. This 
competition, like DARPA’s Ten Red Balloons, highlights the importance of the social 
aspect of such endeavors. “Teams appear to have developed a strong social cohesion – 
individuals likely became interested in participating and assisting because they wanted to 
help the group.”101 While these findings simply reinforce the results of other 
crowdsourcing projects, they differ in that they were seeking objects or individuals in the 
real world and were able to do so extremely quickly and efficiently when compared with 
traditional methods. This sort of search is directly applicable to any efforts at 
crowdsourcing of domestic intelligence. 
98 Christopher M. Ford, “Twitter, Facebook, and Ten Red Balloons: Social Network Problem Solving 
and Homeland Security,” Homeland Security Affairs, vol 7, art 3, February 2011, 
http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=7.1.3.  
99 Evan Ratliff, “Vanish: Finding Evan Ratliff,” Wired Magazine, August 14, 2009, 
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C. APPLICABILITY OF CROWDSOURCING TO DOMESTIC 
INTELLIGENCE 
Combined, these case studies highlight several key aspects to crowdsourcing as a 
technique for gathering intelligence. The most important and perhaps the least intuitive 
fact is that crowds almost always outperform experts in the field. Howe makes the 
argument that, “the many can work together to outperform the few,” and further 
expounds later that, “the crowd will almost always outperform any number of 
employees.”102 Brabham echoes this sentiment when contemplating crowdsourcing in the 
scientific community by saying that, “the perspectives and internal problem-solving 
heuristics of outsiders allow them to see novel solutions to problems that experts at the 
center of a scientific domain may not be able to see.”103 Combined with an expertise and 
familiarity with local customs and routines, this outsider’s perspective to problem solving 
has the potential to allow local citizens to perform as adept suspicious activity detectors. 
Unencumbered by what is traditionally seen as indicators of threats, local citizens may 
see and interpret threats that an expert in law enforcement may not. By combining a 
crowdsourced methodology with the expertise and assets of traditional intelligence 
operators, a crowdsourced domestic intelligence program would allow the experts to 
focus on connecting the dots, managing the process, and coordinating with other sources 
of intelligence rather than acting as the boots on the ground in the collection of lone-wolf 
terrorism indicators. The intelligence professionals are not superseded with this process. 
Rather, they are augmented and reinforced by a network of actively involved citizens. 
The second advantage these cases highlight is the large successes obtained by 
bringing large amounts of manpower to bear on large problems. While this in itself is 
fairly intuitive, what is striking is the ease with which such coordination of massive 
amounts of people can be accomplished thanks to the connectivity and automation 
inherent to the Internet. The winning team from DARPA’s Ten Red Balloons challenge 
only found out about the contest a few days prior and was able to organize a network of 
thousands of active and motivated participants into a cohesive team within that short time 
102 Howe, Crowdsourcing, 11–12. 
103 Brabham, Crowdsourcing, 21. 
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period.104 Once the contest began, that same team was able to coordinate with those same 
thousands of participants in real time, collecting and analyzing data at rates which would 
be unachievable without the Internet. “The short-term growing pains that will surely 
accompany a transition [to crowdsourcing] will be outweighed, I believe, by the long-
term benefits of a flattened environment in which we will all become valuable 
contributors.”105 This is largely due to the fact that, “the amount of knowledge and talent 
dispersed among the numerous members of our species has always vastly outstripped our 
capacity to harness those invaluable qualities.”106 This sort of efficiency in coordination 
and flattening of the organizational structure will be critical in any large project 
connecting a widely distributed group of participants such as a nationally coordinated, 
citizen-dependent intelligence effort. 
Motivation of participants is another key factor which all of these successful 
crowdsourcing efforts have in common. Whether it is through a more traditional method 
such as the nominal salary that MTurk provides or the gamification approach that Waze 
uses, all the projects acknowledge that motivation of participants is critical in 
crowdsourcing. Due to political and economic constraints, it is unlikely that a domestic 
intelligence effort will be able to use the most traditional motivation, salaries. As such, 
the focus of the discussion in Chapter IV on motivation, as it applies to crowdsourced 
domestic intelligence, will necessarily be on such approaches as rewards based systems 
and gamification. Chapter IV also examines methods to exploit people’s internal 
motivations of increased personal security and a desire to assist the local community. 
This focus on internal motivations has definite advantages since studies have shown that 
problems framed with intrinsic rewards, such as helping others, are shown to have higher 
quality work associated with them.107 
One of the disadvantages experienced in crowdsourcing is that a poor start is very 
difficult to bounce back from. This is due to the heavy reliance on community building 
104 Ford, “Twitter, Facebook, and Ten Red Balloons.” 
105 Howe, Crowdsourcing, 19. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Rogstadius, “Assessment of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation,” 321. 
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and participation inherent to crowdsourced projects. This emphasis on and need of a 
community presents a paradox of sorts for developing crowdsourced projects. They need 
a vibrant and active community to attract participants but they need a critical mass of 
participants to create an active and vibrant community. Assignment Zero, an early 
attempt at crowdsourcing investigative journalism, suffered from this very paradox, 
resulting in early termination of the project.108 Assignment Zero built the required 
framework to host and engage a community of citizen journalists, but without an 
established forum with moderators and content in place, visitors rarely returned for a 
second visit and even more rarely contributed. Learning from this mistake and many 
others like it, a crowdsourced intelligence effort would need to seed a community via 
other means such as employees dedicated to cultivating community involvement and pre-
established content ready for consumption by participants on day one. What such content 
might consist of in a domestic intelligence setting is addressed in Chapter IV. 
Another significant disadvantage inherent to crowdsourcing is the reduced control 
the parent organization can exert when compared to traditional methods of managing 
labor. “The crowd wants to feel a sense of ownership over its creation, and is keenly 
aware when it is being exploited. The company, in this context, is just one more member 
of the community.”109 This need for transparency will be the largest hurdle the 
intelligence community will face in implementing a crowdsourced intelligence effort due 
to its very insular and secretive nature. The intelligence community’s desire to keep as 
many things secret as possible is in direct conflict with the openness required in 
successful crowdsourced efforts. Brabham maintains that, “relationships between 
organizations and stakeholders are usually strongest when they are mutually beneficial, 
when they are symmetrical and communication flows two ways.”110 Howe acknowledges 
that this shift in thinking is not easy, even for private enterprise but maintains that it is the 
core of any successful crowdsourcing effort. “What unites all successful crowdsourcing 
efforts is a deep commitment to the community. This entails much more than lip service 
108 Howe, Crowdsourcing, 214. 
109 Ibid., 15–16. 
110 Brabham, Crowdsourcing, 109. 
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and requires a drastic shift in the mind-set of a traditional corporation.”111 This need for 
transparency and two-way communication in crowdsourcing efforts is one of the two 
major reasons that the local See Something, Say Something mobile applications have 
failed, along with lack of public attention. Those who participate using such programs as 
SAFE-NJ provide information to law enforcement but are not engaged or encouraged to 
further participate. It is a one-way street to a black hole into which they provide their 
information. This kind of mechanism breeds disinterest and disuse. If the intelligence 
community can come to terms with the requirements for transparency and two-way 
communication, while at the same time maintaining the secrets needed for national 
security, then it could have access to a new and powerful tool in its arsenal to combat 
lone-wolf terrorism. 
  
111 Howe, Crowdsourcing, 15. 
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IV. APPLYING CROWDSOURCING TO DOMESTIC 
INTELLIGENCE 
Chapter II examined the problem of detecting lone-wolf terrorist activities prior to 
their acts being carried out. It attempted to distill those indicators which current domestic 
intelligence methods are ill-equipped to identify and examine why these methods are not 
suitable for the unique threat of lone-wolf terrorists. Chapter III provided an overview of 
crowdsourcing as a solution to a host of commercial problems and ways the private sector 
has harnessed this new tool. It also highlighted the advantages a crowdsourced approach 
brings to problem solving as well as pitfalls that crowdsourcing must avoid in order to be 
successful. Chapter IV matches the problem of identifying lone-wolf terrorist indicators 
with crowdsourcing as a method of solution by first examining in detail the nascent 
domestic intelligence crowdsourcing efforts currently in existence and determining why 
they have had limited success. Chapter IV then provides a template for a robust and 
responsive domestic intelligence crowdsourcing program that uses commercial 
crowdsourcing successes to guide it. It concludes by outlining the benefits, both 
immediate and ancillary, that such a program would provide to the law enforcement and 
intelligence communities. 
A. CURRENT DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE CROWDSOURCING 
ATTEMPTS 
A search through the iTunes and Android app stores yields over one hundred 
different mobile applications for the reporting of criminal and suspicious behavior to law 
enforcement. This plethora of applications that are freely available to smart phone users, 
most offered and endorsed directly by different law enforcement agencies, confirms that 
the potential benefits of crowdsourced domestic intelligence is seen by the establishment. 
Were benefits not anticipated by law enforcement by such a program, then the limited 
time, resources, and effort of these local and often underfunded organizations would not 
have been invested in such a new and unproven method of intelligence collection. Even 
with this large interest by law enforcement, there have been few tangible results, either 
arrests or prevention of crime, due to mobile application reporting. A search of news 
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articles on crime prevention and arrests relating to mobile crime reporting applications 
from the past two years yields only two U.S. incidents in which mobile application 
reporting led directly to an arrest.112 The question one must ask is, if crowdsourcing has 
successes at solving other problems and law enforcement has shown interest in using it 
for domestic intelligence, then why is it failing to yield any results? 
There are several related and overlapping issues which have contributed to the 
poor performance of current domestic intelligence crowdsourcing attempts but they all 
revolve around the fact that officials are attempting to use crowdsourcing without 
understanding its strengths and weaknesses and failing to learn from commercial 
successes and failures with crowdsourcing. Foremost, law enforcement officials are 
viewing crowdsourced intelligence as simply an additional conduit of their established 
community reporting method, crime prevention hotlines. Though there are similarities, at 
its heart a crowdsourced effort at problem solving is based around community 
involvement and requires two-way communication.113 All of the domestic intelligence 
applications examined for this thesis provided only one-way communication. In all the 
applications, a citizen reports suspicious or criminal activity via the app to law 
enforcement. The report is processed, analyzed, and investigated by officials but there is 
no means of providing feedback to the citizen. Few of the apps even provided a read-
receipt acknowledging successful transmittal of the information. This lack of interaction 
and opacity in the process fails to elicit repeat interactions and does not engage the user. 
The second major roadblock encountered by current domestic intelligence 
crowdsourcing efforts is the fragmentation of their efforts and hence the small scale of 
each individual effort. Most of the applications reviewed only cover a single county or 
major city while SAFE-NJ, the broadest reaching of them, covers the state of New Jersey. 
This fragmentation causes confusion for the citizens, which contributes to low adoption 
112 Terri Sanginiti, “Crime Tip App Leads to Drug Arrest,” Delaware Online News Journal, October 
8, 2014, http://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/crime/2014/10/08/crime-tip-app-leads-drug-
arrest/16921703/. 
  Harris County Sheriff’s Office, “iWatchHarrisCounty App Users Do It Again; Tips Lead to Drugs 
and Arrests,” Nixle, October 23, 2013, https://local.nixle.com/alert/5290183/.   
113 Howe, Crowdsourcing, 15. 
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rates. Fragmentation also results in disjointed efforts by law enforcement due to 
disaggregated data collection. Criminals and terrorists do not abide by city limits and 
municipal boundaries. Information provided by one local domestic intelligence app is 
transmitted only to the local law enforcement office in charge of that app. It is then up to 
that law enforcement office to distribute the information to those other agencies which it 
feels is in need of it. This method of distribution usually involves a human in the loop and 
as such, is much more tedious and prone to errors than an automated system. This is the 
sort of problem highlighted by the 9/11 Commission’s report on the failures of the 
intelligence community to stop those terrorist attacks. This fragmentation leads to a 
structural failure to connect the dots.114 The information may be known to some select 
group of people but if the right people don’t know it, then it isn’t actionable. 
The third hindrance to current efforts at crowdsourcing domestic intelligence 
stems from poor public relations and public awareness. Crowdsourcing is a human 
behavior and not a technology, though it requires technology to occur.115 As such, for it 
to be effective, one needs the human element to participate in the endeavor. Recent 
attempts have faltered because of a lack of awareness by the public at large. Sporadic 
radio advertisements and a few billboards have been the method most commonly used to 
promote these local crowdsourced intelligence efforts and have failed to reach a large 
section of the population or capture the interest of the ones who were exposed to the 
advertising.116 In some ways, this is a secondary roadblock resulting from the 
fragmentary approach law enforcement is taking. When each agency develops their own 
reporting app, they must each individually manage it and promote it as well. This results 
in duplicated public relations costs for agencies which do not have large budgets for such 
projects in the first place. These factors lead to poorly designed advertising with limited 
release and contribute to the small adoption rates by citizens. 
114 9/11 Commission, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2004), 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf, 408.  
115 Howe, Crowdsourcing, 11. 
116 Evan MacDonald, “Five Months After Launch, Use of Crime Tips App Low in Northeast Ohio,” 
Cleveland.com, October 23, 2013, 
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2013/10/five_months_after_launch_use_o.html.  
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The one thing most of the reporting apps have successfully adopted from civilian 
crowdsourcing efforts is the ability to lower the cost of participation for the users. The 
majority of people in the United States own a smart phone and the smart phone plays a 
large part in how they interact with the world.117 They are comfortable with the form and 
function of such a device so that the addition of an application for reporting suspicious 
activity would not require a long education process; most of the current reporting 
applications are very user friendly and intuitive. Each of the three reporting apps tested 
for this thesis took less than fifteen seconds from opening to sending of basic 
informational reports. If personal identification, location data, and a picture were added, 
the time to report averaged between 20 and 30 seconds. Users are much more likely to 
participate and contribute to any effort if doing so only requires minimal time and effort 
on their part. This ease of use is paramount to maintaining an active user base. While the 
previously discussed pitfalls should be avoided by any future efforts at crowdsourced 
domestic intelligence, this reduction in the cost of participation should be emulated. 
In summary, the current attempts at crowdsourced domestic intelligence have 
failed because they ignore or poorly address most of the tenets of establishing a 
successful crowdsourcing effort. These tenets have been learned through trial and error 
over the past several years by the private sector but are widely documented and easily 
implemented at this point in time. Any future attempts at crowdsourcing domestic 
intelligence should pay special heed to the lessons learned from previous crowdsourcing 
endeavors instead of attempting to reinvent the wheel. 
B. A NATIONAL CROWDSOURCED DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE 
ENTERPRISE 
As it stands now, law enforcement has taken its first embryonic steps into the 
realm of crowdsourcing. The value and efficiency crowdsourcing brings to problems has 
been recognized and adopted in many places as an alternative source of domestic 
intelligence for crime prevention. Failure to recognize that a crowdsourcing solution 
requires a unique approach and a tailored environment have hampered current efforts. 
117 Aaron Smith, “Smartphone Ownership 2013,” Pew Research Internet Project, June 5, 2013, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/06/05/smartphone-ownership-2013.  
 58 
                                                 
Using the lessons from these failures and the lessons outlined in Chapter III of the 
successes in commercial crowdsourcing efforts, this thesis will now provide a feasible, 
robust, and flexible approach to crowdsourcing domestic intelligence. 
Of prime importance is the need for any new system to be national in nature. The 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is poised in an ideal position to take the lead of 
such an effort. DHS is a national organization with federal funding much greater than any 
local or state law enforcement agency and has direct contact and cooperation with all 
other organizations interested in domestic intelligence, from the national level down to 
local law enforcement. DHS is an entity large enough to manage such a national effort 
but is not so enmeshed with current intelligence operations, like the CIA or NSA, that a 
crowdsourcing effort would be automatically dismissed by the public. Nationwide 
coverage by a single program is of paramount importance for several reasons. 
Nationalizing the crowdsourcing effort pools resources and prevents overlaps and 
inefficiencies by all parties involved. It is much less expensive to have one major and 
fully-capable public relations staff managing a national campaign than the sum total cost 
of hundreds of local and often ad hoc attempts at advertising for such efforts. One voice 
with one message prevents confusion by the public as well. Citizens no longer have to 
wade through pages of suspicious activity reporting apps on their mobile phone trying to 
find their local one. Additionally, the public will feel more secure knowing that the 
program they are using has been nationally vetted and trusted. This feeling of security 
will translate to people being more likely to download and use such a program. 
On the backend of the program, nationalization will have several useful 
advantages as well. A single database receiving all inputs from every user in the United 
States results in a much larger pool of data for analysis and comparison. As stated 
previously, terrorists and criminals do not adhere to municipal or state boundaries. 
Similar suspicious activity noted in several different geographic locations will have a 
much better chance of being correlated if all the information is in one database. With 
current programs, this merging of data happens manually and slowly at best or, at worst, 
not at all. With the power and sophistication of big data management available with 
today’s technology, this glut of data need not result in information overload. Using 
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simple time and location filters, any organization with access to the data, from local law 
enforcement to national intelligence agencies, can view and manipulate only the data they 
find relevant and useful to them. While all parties would retain the ability to view the 
entire database, the ability to filter certain information would make it more manageable 
and relevant to the smaller law enforcement units. Embedded in the database 
management of such a program would be algorithms automatically searching for similar 
or related reports in the entire database. “Sophisticated analytics can substantially 
improve decision making, minimize risks, and unearth valuable insights that would 
otherwise remain hidden.”118 These algorithms would help connect the dots even if every 
organization viewing the data chose to self-impose blinders and only analyze the pieces 
of data emanating from their geographic region. 
Nationalizing the crowdsourced domestic intelligence enterprise would also more 
easily tie it into other forms of intelligence. This ability to tie disparate reports from 
different sources is especially important in the search for such elusive targets as lone-
wolf terrorists. As was shown in Chapter II, lone wolves are even more prone to slipping 
through the cracks of traditional detection than traditional terrorist groups and require 
officials to detect the more subtle clues they provide. Instead of linking databases of other 
intelligence to hundreds of local efforts individually, a national database would be a one-
stop location for all other forms of intelligence to draw upon and contribute to. 
The second key change that needs to be implemented in any new domestic 
intelligence crowdsourcing efforts is the interaction between the program and the 
citizens. While current mobile reporting applications have excelled at lowering the cost 
of participation by making the experience simple, fast, and anonymous, they have fallen 
short in the most critical of crowdsourcing needs, building a community of participants. 
Crowdsourcing thrives in an environment of two-way communication and 
transparency.119 These requirements are the antithesis of traditional intelligence beliefs 
and it is therefore not surprising that previous crowdsourcing efforts for domestic 
118 Manyika and Chui, Big Data, 99. 
119 Brabham, Crowdsourcing, 109. 
      Howe, Crowdsourcing, 15. 
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intelligence have completely eschewed them. Rather than being a black hole into which 
citizens throw their data, never to be seen again, a domestic intelligence application needs 
to be interactive. The application needs to provide the user with an experience to which 
they desire to return and interact. It needs to provide feedback when a user submits 
information and ideally, it needs to act as a meeting place for different users to interact, 
share ideas, and collaborate. Providing this interactive and compelling experience is the 
best way to generate new users and ensure current users remain active. 
As shown in Chapter III, gamification has the potential to provide such an 
environment for the users. Competition between users in reporting events and leader 
boards for publicly tracking the most successful users are powerful motivators.120 
Incorporation of peer review is another potential advantage gamification provides. If one 
user posts a picture of a suspicious car parked illegally, other users could view and vote 
on whether they considered it a threat as well. Independent verification would increase 
the priority of the report for police investigation and earn both the submitter and voters 
points for their leader board. Additional extrinsic rewards could include unique virtual 
badges that users could display to their friends in the application or even small tangible 
rewards for the highest rated users over a given period of time, such as a free movie 
rental code for a local movie rental kiosk. Such methods have proven successful 
motivators in the private sector. 
Obviously, domestic intelligence is unlike most commercial efforts at 
crowdsourcing because it lacks the ready-to-consume content that Waze or MTurk has. 
This is a surmountable problem with a bit of unorthodox thinking. In order to engage the 
users early and often, practice or exercise reporting events should be implemented. A 
continual series of contests such as, “earn five points for every report of a red van parked 
at an airport loading zone,” would generate user interest and engage them and make them 
comfortable with the reporting system. Vetted by system administrators, these practice 
submissions would be pushed to other users for verification. Was it actually a red van or 
was it purple? Was it parked at an airport loading zone? Voters who correctly identified 
120 Deterding, “From Game Design Elements to Gamefulness,” 14–15. 
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the submissions would earn points of their own as well. The exercise vehicles and 
personnel could either be randomly generated like a scavenger hunt or could be planted 
by the overseeing organization by having an employee participate, in much the same way 
that DARPA planted the ten red balloons. One could have an individual sit at a train 
terminal wearing a purple cowboy hat and then ask users to locate him. This would not 
only help rate users and their abilities but would also test the system as a whole: how fast 
was the system able to find this unique individual, how many people reported him, etc. 
While the main goal of the entire crowdsourced domestic intelligence effort is to 
identify unknown and hidden indicators of actual terrorist activities, which would not be 
scripted; however, these scripted events do serve a purpose of familiarizing users with the 
system, rating users on their abilities and trustworthiness, and engaging the users in a way 
that ensures they continue to use and interact with the program. This is critical in the 
search for lone-wolf terrorists since the indicators of such activity will be subtle in nature. 
When a citizen observes suspicious behavior, they should have already been exposed to 
and familiarized with a means to quickly and effectively provide that information to 
officials who can then act upon it. Without this prior exposure and feeling of being part 
of the solution, individuals are much more likely to dismiss suspicious behavior outright 
or simply write off reporting it as someone else’s problem. As learned from commercial 
crowdsourcing efforts, with familiarization and engagement an individual is much more 
likely to use the reporting tools available and get the needed information to the 
appropriate officials. 
In the long term, the points individuals earn would help the system rate the 
individual users and weight reports submitted by leading users more heavily based on 
their proven track record.121 Other methods of weighting could be used as well. Reports 
with contact data or reports from registered users could be given greater weight. Users 
who had verified with the system that they were of a special trusted category, such as law 
enforcement officials, military, etc., could be given higher weight as well. Conversely, 
users who repeatedly submit false data would be given lower ratings in an effort to cull 
121 Nodder, Evil by Design, 211–215. 
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false data from the system. Only when such reports correlate with other, more reliable, 
reports on the same subject would they be given increased attention. 
The above paragraphs outline a plan for increasing interaction with users as well 
as creating extrinsic rewards for of a crowdsourced domestic intelligence system. These 
extrinsic rewards are most useful in developing an initial user base and in increasing 
participation rates of users. To increase the quality of user participation, research has 
shown that intrinsic rewards are most effective.122 Providing those intrinsic rewards to 
the users will largely be the job of the public relations campaign. Promoting the benefits 
of a crowdsourced domestic intelligence effort such as increased personal security, 
reduced police force workloads, and assistance to the citizen’s local community will all 
be key factors in any public relations campaign. Touting these benefits will be less 
effective at recruiting new users but will provide the motivation to current users to submit 
more accurate and detailed reports to the system. 
Secondary to the needs of a nationalized effort with a high-profile public relations 
campaign and an engaged community of users are several other factors that will 
contribute to a successful domestic intelligence crowdsourcing effort. One of these 
additional factors is the implementation of a national telephone hotline for reporting 
suspicious activities. This hotline would serve to connect the shrinking percentage of 
U.S. citizens without a smart phone and allow them to contribute to the database in the 
most efficient and effective way possible. The same advantages outlined for nationalizing 
the mobile app applies to a nationalized hotline. Any existing local tip lines need not be 
shut down, but instead calls to them would be forwarded to the national effort’s call 
center for inclusion into the unified database. While a traditional hotline fails to foster the 
community involvement and gamification a mobile application provides, it does serve the 
purpose of tapping a large segment of the population which lacks smart phone access. 
Another useful but less critical factor in creating a successful program is the 
incorporation and dissemination of outside intelligence information. If local law 
enforcement has vague leads in tracking suspicious behavior, such as a specific car 
122 Rogstadius, “Assessment of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation,” 321. 
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driving erratically, then that information should be pushed to the application’s users. It 
need not be presented in a manner which might cause personal information violations 
such as distributing specific license plate information. Rather, a simple alert pushed to 
appropriate local users about a specific make and color of a vehicle could prove useful. 
This is fully aligned with the goal of providing two-way communication between the 
users and the program managers and will help foster a sense of community. Though 
many erroneous reports on the subject may be submitted, since there are likely to be 
many innocent vehicles matching the description, cursory analysis can separate out those 
reports applicable to the specific investigation. Balancing the benefits of providing search 
information to the network of users will need to be weighed against the large desire for 
privacy that most Americans hold dear. A strong public relations campaign combined 
with a transparent operating environment with user buy-in should go a long way in 
assuaging the public’s fear of big brother watching over their shoulder. Done correctly, 
the majority of the public should instead see this crowdsourced domestic intelligence 
effort for what it is, an attempt at self-policing and community assistance with problems 
affecting all citizens such as terrorism and crime. 
C. BENEFITS OF A NATIONWIDE CROWDSOURCED DOMESTIC 
INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE 
A nationally implemented and fully supported crowdsourced domestic 
intelligence effort will provide an additional source of information for combating 
domestic terrorism using local expertise to thwart one of the most elusive subjects, the 
lone-wolf terrorist. It will also provide the additional benefits of acting as a conduit for 
information on other activities, such as illegal trafficking, common crime, etc., from the 
public which has the information to law enforcement officials able to act on the 
information. In implementing such a transparent and open method of intelligence, the 
public’s perception of law enforcement and intelligence communities can be expected to 
improve as the public takes a more involved role in the process of intelligence collection 
and attains buy-in to the process. It is hard for people to be distrustful of or resent a 
system which they are a part of. Instead, the most likely human response is to attempt to 
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better the system through individual effort. This will in turn create stronger citizenship 
and better community cohesion. 
Technology has provided the intelligence community and law enforcement a 
means to harness the local expertise of the masses in order to create one of the largest and 
most pervasive collection networks for domestic intelligence. Previous attempts have 
been fragmented, poorly understood by the public, and largely useless as a result. 
Building on these prior ventures into crowdsourcing domestic intelligence, a new effort 
needs to be nationally sized, transparent, engaging, widely publicized, and thoroughly 
connected to law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Lone-wolf terrorists provide 
indicators of impending attacks but those indicators tend to be more subtle and 
distributed to a smaller group of individuals than ones from more traditional terrorist 
groups. Stella Rimington, former head of the British Secret Service, is quoted as saying 
that “effective counter-terrorism frequently begins closer to home and may appear a lot 
more mundane.”123 As such, academics such as Dahl have concluded that, “relatively 
mundane types of human intelligence—including informants, undercover operatives, and 
tips from the public—are the most effective counterterrorism tool.”124 Crowdsourcing 
domestic intelligence provides a novel and useful way of pushing those subtle indicators 
from the private individuals receiving them to the government organizations that can act 
on the information and stop the attack. Using the above guidelines for successful 
crowdsourcing, officials, and U.S. society as a whole, are poised to reap the benefits of 
crowdsourcing the problem of identifying and stopping the unique threat that is the lone-
wolf terrorist. 
  
123 Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack, 169. 
124 Ibid. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND POSSIBLE FUTURE RESEARCH 
“My fellow Americans, ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you 
can do for your country.” This unforgettable statement, spoken by President John F. 
Kennedy during his 1961 inauguration speech, is now over half a century old. It has 
become a cliché for most people; the ideal behind it, that citizens should work and strive 
to make their nation a better place rather than only expecting the state to provide for the 
population, has been lost through the decades. The twenty-first century is a world of 
instant gratification and people asking, “What’s in it for me?” Instead, there are tangible 
and measurable actions that each U.S. citizen can perform to help further the interests of 
our nation as a whole and to help protect the population at large. A potentially significant 
way in which the U.S. public can assist with its own defense is the observation and 
reporting of suspicious activities in an effort to detect and prevent terrorism in general 
and, more specifically, lone-wolf terrorism. The lone wolf has emerged as the primary 
organizational method that terrorists attacking the United States are using today and its 
unique structure, or lack thereof, presents large challenges to the traditional U.S. 
intelligence community. These challenges could be more effectively and efficiently met 
using nontraditional forms of intelligence collection such as crowdsourced domestic 
intelligence. 
A. COUNTERARGUMENT 
In an era of Snowden leaks, sweeping clandestine surveillance such as PRISM, 
and secret FISA courts, much of the U.S. population may be understandably hesitant in 
supporting and approving yet another method of domestic intelligence such as the 
previously advocated crowdsourcing venture. As of January 2014, the majority of 
Americans disapprove of current national domestic intelligence efforts.125 There is 
increasing distrust of government in general and the intelligence community specifically 
across all stratum of American society. Polls indicate that the U.S. public wants the 
125 Susan Page, “Poll: Most Americans Now Oppose the NSA Program,” USA Today, January 20, 
2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/01/20/poll-nsa-surveillance/4638551/. 
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government to be less intrusive and less knowledgeable about the average person’s daily 
life. Even Congressional leaders, historically seen as much more supportive of 
government programs such as PRISM, have become almost evenly divided between 
supporters and opponents of such measures.126 
Taking these factors of public opinion into account, it would appear at first glance 
that creating yet another intelligence program, overseen by another government agency 
and which would glean additional information about the public, would be a futile effort. 
Looking past the superficial comparisons to other domestic intelligence programs, a 
crowdsourced method of detecting and preventing lone-wolf terrorists could provide a 
relatively low-intrusion alternative to traditional methods of collecting domestic 
intelligence. 
Foremost, a crowdsourced domestic intelligence program would be completely 
voluntary. The only information the government would receive about the public would be 
what the public provides through the mobile applications and hotlines. More akin to a 
crime stopper tip line than a traditional intelligence program, crowdsourcing would not 
involve the surreptitious collection of citizen’s private data by the government. Instead, 
local citizens with local expertise would determine what they deem suspicious and 
worthy of reporting to the authorities for further investigation. The longstanding Peelian 
policing principle of, “[Recognizing] always that the extent to which the co-operation of 
the public can be secured diminishes proportionately the necessity of the use of physical 
force and compulsion for achieving police objectives,”127 can be co-opted and adapted 
for the intelligence community. Restated for such a purpose, the cooperation of the public 
proportionally diminishes the necessity to use invasive and compulsory collection 
methods to achieve counterterrorist objectives. For the purpose of countering lone-wolf 
terrorists, a crowdsourced effort that calls the populace to action and enables a self-
policing culture has the potential to better detect the subtle indicators of lone-wolf 
126 Jonathan Weisman, “Momentum Builds Against N.S.A. Surveillance,” The New York Times, July 
28, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/29/us/politics/momentum-builds-against-nsa-
surveillance.html?pagewanted=all.  
127 Robert Peel, “Policing By Consent,” Gov.UK, December 10, 2012, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/policing-by-consent.  
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activity at a lower cost to the taxpayers while better preserving the privacy of the average 
citizen. 
All of the advantages and benefits of a crowdsourced domestic intelligence 
program are predicated on a robust and active network of concerned citizens. With low 
levels of buy-in by the public and disuse of the program, a crowdsourcing effort would 
stagnate and yield very few results. Crowdsourcing, at its core, is a human endeavor not a 
technological one. The technology of smart phones, mobile applications, and big data 
management merely facilitate the human endeavor on a scale previously unattainable. As 
such, the core of any nationally deployed crowdsourcing intelligence effort should be 
with public education and engagement. Advertisements, public service announcements, 
and public figure talking points should all focus the public on how such an effort is 
beneficial to them in keeping the United States safe from lone-wolf terrorists while 
reducing the intensiveness of government into their lives. Emphasis should be placed on 
the partnership aspect of such an endeavor between the public and law enforcement. The 
public has expressed the dual desires of safety from terrorist attacks and reduced 
intrusion by government intelligence. A crowdsourced intelligence program is one way of 
meeting these potentially opposed desires but it comes with the cost of participation by 
the citizens. It would require the masses to cease being a flock of sheep to be tended to 
and protected by the shepherd of government and instead become a pod of dolphins, 
encircled to ward off attacks by predators from all sides in a group effort. This unity of 
effort between the citizenry and the government stands as a potential game changer in the 
war on terror. 
B. CONCLUSION 
This thesis began by examining the historical roots of the marquee terrorist group 
of the twenty-first century, Al-Qaeda, and traced its evolution from a hierarchical 
organization to one of splinter groups, franchises, and ultimately a source of nebulous 
ideology for independent operators. It then defined the lone-wolf terrorist and explained 
how the lone wolf differs from traditional hierarchical terrorist groups. These 
differences—extremely small organizational structures, highly insulated planning, and 
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expert knowledge of local routines and practices—combine to make preventing them a 
difficult endeavor. This thesis then examined current domestic intelligence efforts, from 
traditional SIGINT to the more recent community policing, which attempt to counter this 
emergent threat, and explained why those measures fall short. These current domestic 
intelligence efforts’ shortcomings largely lay with their methodology’s inability to cope 
with the specific traits of lone-wolf terrorism, resulting in the operational advantages 
enjoyed by lone-wolf terrorists. 
After the problem of lone-wolf terrorism and the specific challenges it presents 
were examined, the thesis then sought solutions to similar problems found in the private 
sector. Attempts by corporations to retrieve, consolidate, and distribute large amounts of 
widely dispersed data have recently revolved around crowdsourcing as a viable and 
efficient tool. From the navigation application Waze, to the distributed workforce of 
MTurk, to the highly successful searches conducted by DARPA and Wired Magazine, 
these projects were shown to quickly and efficiently collect, manage, and allow 
individual usage of data previously unavailable at any organizational level. These 
crowdsourced approaches to problem solving require specific structures and methods 
which have been missing from the current nascent attempts by local law enforcement at 
similar efforts for domestic intelligence. 
This thesis continued by analyzing the potential of harnessing the power of 
crowdsourcing at the local level for national domestic intelligence needs, as well as the 
advantages such an approach provides. This thesis then recommended specific structures 
and methodologies that could be implemented to assist in such a program. Ultimately, 
this thesis advocates for the development of a new branch of domestic intelligence. 
Managed and coordinated by the Department of Homeland Security, this program of 
crowdsourced domestic intelligence would be distributed to, and coordinated with, the 
national intelligence community while reaching down to local law enforcement officials 
for two-way information flow. Only a few agencies have the requisite contacts that reach 
from the local to national level in order to make such a program a truly unified 
undertaking. As an added benefit to DHS, this would provide them with a unique form of 
intelligence to control and distribute to other agencies. This contribution could help 
 70 
solidify DHS’s legitimacy as a national intelligence agency alongside the CIA and NSA. 
Currently the DHS is a consumer and distributor of intelligence but does not produce 
intelligence itself; a crowdsourced domestic intelligence program could change this.128 
The program should be housed under the Office of Intelligence and Analysis at the DHS, 
but would require expansion in both personnel and resources to properly execute this new 
mission. A crowdsourced domestic intelligence effort would rely on citizens within the 
community to provide intelligence operators with timely, pervasive, persistent, and 
actionable intelligence at the ground level to combat emerging terrorist threats and 
provides an easy way for the populace to answer the question, “what can I do for my 
country?” 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis serves as starting point for further research on crowdsourced solutions 
to domestic intelligence and lone-wolf terrorism prevention. Due to the lack of previous 
academic work on this specific topic, this thesis took a generalized overview approach to 
addressing the problem and in finding appropriate solutions. Only a handful of the 
hundreds of historical lone-wolf attacks were examined in depth and a more detailed 
analysis of a larger set of attacks may prove useful in confirming the conclusions that 
were reached using limited case studies. Similarly, crowdsourcing is a rapidly expanding 
problem-solving tool used by the private sector. Further examples of both successes and 
failures of crowdsourced enterprises are continuing to be documented on an almost daily 
basis. These new examples should be examined for any new lessons or techniques which 
could be used in a crowdsourced domestic intelligence effort. Additionally, not only are 
new crowdsourcing projects being created but techniques and methods are continuing to 
be refined and improved. These improvements could also be incorporated in future 
research. A more in-depth and analytical examination of both the problem of lone-wolf 
terrorism and crowdsourced solutions may yield more specific recommendations for a 
crowdsourced domestic intelligence effort.  
128 Department of Homeland Security, “More About the Office of Intelligence and Analysis Mission,” 
Homeland Security, December 9, 2013, http://www.dhs.gov/more-about-office-intelligence-and-analysis-
mission#1.  
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Finally, at a more actionable level, further research into the feasibility and cost of 
such a program should be conducted by a presidentially appointed commission that 
would report to the secretary of homeland security. This commission should be 
comprised of federal, state, and local officials as well as representatives from civil liberty 
organizations and public interest groups. The commission’s investigation should focus on 
citizen acceptance, cost estimates, and issues of connecting already existing local 
programs to a national effort. The results of such a study would codify the feasibility of a 
crowdsourced domestic intelligence effort and determine how and where it would fit into 
the overall efforts to combat domestic terrorism. 
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